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SUMMARY 
 
The relationships between procrastination, self-regulation, and fatigue were 
assessed.  Previous researchers have suggested that procr stination is positively related to 
fatigue (Gropel & Steel, 2008), and that the use of self-regulation results in higher levels 
of fatigue (Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998).  In the present study, I proposed that 
self-regulation is the mechanism underlying the relationship between procrastination and 
fatigue.  Undergraduate students (N=110) first completed an in-lab questionnaire, then 
completed 15 online questionnaires per week for three weeks.  The online questionnaires 
assessed sleeping and waking habits, along with reports of state fatigue.  Procrastination 
was assessed through the time spent putting off gettin  out of bed each morning.  
Participants were split into two groups, and the experimental group was instructed to use 
an alarm clock without a snooze button during Week 2.  Three findings were of interest.  
First, in contrast to global, self-reported behavior, aggregated measures of daily self-
reported procrastination indicated a positive relationship with trait measures of 
procrastination, suggesting that global self-reports f behavior delay should be 
interpreted with caution.  Second, trait procrastination was found to be a significant 
predictor of the amount of time spent delaying getting out of bed in the morning; 
however, the amount of time spent delaying getting out of bed in the morning was not 
predictive of subjective morning or afternoon fatigue.  Finally, partial support was 
provided for a relationship between trait procrastination and state fatigue after accounting 
for other variables which have been shown to predict state subjective fatigue (e.g., 
neuroticism and anxiety; Ackerman, Kanfer, & Wolman, 2008).  Based on these findings, 
I suggest that a stronger relationship exists betwen procrastination and fatigue at the trait 
 ix  
level than the state level, and the state-level relationship may operate through a 
mechanism other than self-regulation. 





Procrastination has recently been defined as the voluntary “delay [of] an intended 
course of action despite expecting to be worse off for the delay” (Steel, 2007, p. 66).  
Approximately 20% of adults report chronic procrastination in everyday tasks (Harriott & 
Ferrari, 1996) and almost 50% report that procrastin tion is problematic (Solomon & 
Rothblum, 1984).  For example, a survey of 100 adults indicated that 29% were currently 
putting off doing their taxes and 42% were currently delaying saving money for the 
future (Kasper, 2004).  Tax firms such as H&R Block estimate that Americans overpay 
their taxes by approximately $400 each year (Coolidge, 2004), perhaps due in part to 
delaying tax preparation.  Taken together, these reports suggest that delaying an intended 
course of action can be costly.  
Financial trouble represents one sphere in which procrastination leads to serious 
consequences.  Sirois (2004) also explored the relationship between self-reported 
procrastination and preventative health behaviors among 182 Canadian students.  
Procrastination was negatively associated with consideration of future consequences (r = 
-.43, p<.01), health-specific self-efficacy (r = -.37, p<.05), and health behavior intentions 
(r = -.21, p<.01).  Lay and Brokenshire (1997) found that job search behaviors, such as 
sending out a resume or searching the classified want ads, were also negatively related to 
self-reported procrastination (r = -.22, p<.05).  Procrastination has also been associated 
with depression (r = .44, p<.01; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), stress (r = .25, p<.01; Chu 
& Choi, 2005), anxiety (r = .13, p<.05; Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), and neuroticism (r 
= .42, p<.01; Milgram & Tenne, 2000). 
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Research on procrastination has burgeoned within the last 30 years, addressing 
potential antecedents and correlates to explore possible interventions that may aid in 
decreasing the tendency to procrastinate.  One area in which research has yet to focus is 
the relationship between procrastination and fatigue.  Fatigue has been defined as a sense 
of tiredness that results from both physical and emotional energy (Brown & Schutte, 
2006; Zijlstra & Sonnentag, 2006) expended for a variety of reasons, such as work 
demands (Rook & Zijlstra, 2006).  In a recent mega-trial of 9351 participants, Gröpel and 
Steel (2008) found that lack of energy predicted a significant portion of variance in 
procrastination (∆R2 = .28, p<.01).  These results are consistent with prior findings from a 
study by Strongman and Burt  (2000) of fifteen college students who kept diaries for six 
weeks and reported tiredness as one of the leading reasons for procrastination.  In the 
mega-trial, lack of energy was assessed with two items: “I often feel lacking in 
enthusiasm” and “I usually lack energy” (α=.84).  These items do not offer insight into 
whether lack of energy includes physical and/or mental energy, whether it is endorsed as 
a general or task-specific reason, or the mechanisms through which procrastination may 
be related to fatigue.   
In what follows, I will describe the process of self-r gulation as a plausible 
mechanism through which procrastination and fatigue may be related.  In the first section, 
I discuss the history of procrastination research, including potential problems with 
common methodologies and a way in which to address them.  In the second, third, and 
fourth sections, I will focus on self-regulation.  In the second section, I discuss self-
regulation as it has been related to procrastinatio, and I will offer a new way in which to 
consider the self-regulation process in the context of dilatory behavior.  Automatic versus 
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controlled processing will be discussed.  I will briefly draw an important distinction 
between self-regulation and self-control in the third section.  In the fourth section, the 
limited resource model of self-regulation will be presented, and will be linked with 
fatigue in the fifth section.  In the sixth section, I explore an analogy between self-
regulation and a muscle.  Finally, in the seventh section, I describe the present research 
study which serves as a first step in illuminating the association between procrastination, 
self-regulation, and fatigue.  The remaining sections are devoted to the procedural steps, 
statistical analyses, results and conclusions drawn from the current study.  
Procrastination 
Given the relative nascence of procrastination research, an overarching theory of 
procrastination does not yet exist, and numerous measur ment strategies have been 
employed to assess the tendency to delay.  Procrastination has been measured extensively 
through self-report measures which have been mainly designed to assess academic or 
everyday procrastination (see Ferrari, Johnson, & McCown, 1995 for a description of the 
most widely-used measures).  However, several issues accompany self-report measures, 
including the assumptions that participants may accurately access their attitudes 
regarding the items presented, that the response scal s adequately capture the responses 
of participants, and that the participants are willing to report honestly (Mischel, 1977).   
In light of the various problems presented by self-r port assessments, researchers 
have developed behavioral measures of procrastination to use in conjunction with self-
report measures.  Solomon and his colleagues assessed procrastination in terms of time, 
including for example, the amount of time it took students to sign up for experiments 
(Solomon & Rothblum, 1984) and how long it took students to begin self-paced quizzes 
 4  
(Rothblum, Solomon, & Murakami, 1986).  A few researchers have assessed 
procrastination as a difference score between predicted and actual time for tasks.  Pychyl, 
Morin, and Salmon (2000), for example, assessed procrastination as the difference 
between students’ predicted study time and actual sdy time.  Buehler, Griffin, and Ross 
(1994) operationalized procrastination in terms of the difference between predicted and 
actual thesis defense dates.  Some studies have assessed procrastination with observer 
ratings, such as teacher ratings of student procrastination (Owens & Newbegin, 1997, 
2000).   
Combining self-report measures with behavioral measures is likely to offer a 
more complete and accurate representation of procrastination (Rushton, Brainerd, & 
Pressley, 1983).  To date, however, research on this top c has largely explored differences 
between individuals in a cross-sectional manner.  As a result, the relationship between 
one self-report measure and one behavioral measure is typically assessed.  According to 
Rushton et al. (1983), “the sum of a set of multiple measurements is a more stable and 
unbiased estimator than any single measurement from the set” (pp. 18-19).  In the same 
way that self-report measures consist of several items pertaining to procrastination, 
multiple measures of the behavior should also be obtained (i.e., several measures of the 
same behavior or a measure of several similar behaviors).  This measurement strategy 
describes the principle of aggregation, through which within-subjects, repeated-measures 
methods are suggested when possible.  Accordingly, se f-report measures should be 
related to an aggregated behavioral measure in order for measurement errors to average 
out and a clearer, more accurate relationship to emerge. 
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Aggregation would also attenuate the interaction of person and situation variables 
described by Mischel (1977).  Because “much human behavior depends delicately on 
environmental considerations” (p. 250), cross-sectional measurements may reflect a 
combination of the variable of interest and the current influence of situational factors, 
which may not be of interest.  These situational influences represent measurement error 
when assessing traits, either systematic, random, or both.  Assessments of the variable 
over a period of time would allow the contextual inf uences, or error, to even out, 
presenting a more consistent measurement of the particul  trait variable. 
The experience-sampling method (ESM; Miner, Glomb, & Hulin, 2005), also 
referred to as daily diary studies or ecological momentary assessments, has become a 
popular method for assessment in many fields due to its numerous advantages (e.g., 
Kimhy et al., 2006; Le, Choi, & Beal, 2006).  This method captures participants’ episodic 
psychological processes over the course of the day, providing richer, more detailed 
information than retrospective questionnaires are abl to capture (Christensen, Barrett, 
Bliss-Moreau, Lebo, & Kaschub, 2003).  ESM appears to be a useful tool for measuring 
state variables that are likely to fluctuate in short periods of time, as opposed to trait 
variables, which are defined as relatively stable ov r long periods of time.  A 
considerable amount of within-subject data may be coll ted and aggregated through this 
method, which, as discussed above, provides a more robust measure of the variable(s), 
giving greater power to detect smaller effects.  As within-subjects designs are not 
frequently used in the procrastination literature, this method might contribute to the 
present understanding of individuals’ tendency to delay.  
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In addition, ESM reduces the amount of possible recall bias that may distort 
participants’ answers.  As Feldman Barrett and Barrett (2001) described, “recalling 
information is a reconstructive process influenced by a multitude of factors” (p. 175).  
ESM allows participants to report experiences, behaviors, thoughts, and feelings as they 
happen rather than attempting to reconstruct them after  period of time.  Responses are 
often time-stamped to give researchers an accurate record of the time at which the 
participants complete questionnaires to ensure that participants are not relying on 
retrospection.  When asked, participants report that ESM captures their true experiences 
better than other, more static methods (Miner et al., 2005).  Taken together, these 
advantages may facilitate higher external validity than what might be obtained through 
retrospective self-report or behavioral methods.   
Only one study has been conducted that utilized ESM to assess procrastination.  
Pychyl, Lee, Thibodeau, and Blunt (2000) explored the affective correlates of 
procrastination among forty-five undergraduate students.  Participants were paged eight 
times a day, for five days preceding an important academic deadline (e.g., exam, project, 
or paper).  When signaled, participants immediately completed questionnaires pertaining 
to the task in which they were currently engaged, the extent to which they currently felt 
that they were procrastinating, feelings towards tasks currently being put off, if any, and 
current affective states.  Upon completion of the fiv -day period, participants completed 
two measures of general procrastination.  Of the 1800 pager signals, participants 
responded to a total of 1465 of them and reported procrastinating 537 times (36.2%).  
Activities in which participants were engaged were rat d as more pleasant (t(42) = 7.77, 
p<.01), less confusing (t(40) = -7.06, p<.01), less difficult (t(41) = -9.45, p<.01), less 
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important (t(42) = -10.54, p<.01), and less stressful (t(42) = -9.95, p<.01) than the 
activities that were being delayed.  However, 36.2% represents a relatively small 
proportion of time-points during which participants were procrastinating, and the 
outcomes resulting from task delay were not assessed.  Interestingly, the relationships 
between current procrastination and both positive and negative affective state were not 
significant, suggesting that state tendencies to procrastinate were not related to 
participants’ state affect.  However, general procrastination was associated with general 
negative affect (r = .35, p<.05).  Nonetheless, this experience-sampling study presents a 
constructive foundation for the use of ESM in the assessment of procrastination.  Future 
studies may build on this initial step by taking further advantage of ESM. 
In summary, procrastination has become a focus of pychological research within 
the last thirty years.  Greater emphasis should be placed on the methodology used to 
assess the antecedents, correlates, and underlying mechanisms of procrastination in order 
to advance the current knowledge towards a theory of procrastination.  One approach that 
may be particularly advantageous in further exploring the ways in which procrastination 
operates may be to follow the suggestion of Rushton e  al. (1983) and aggregate measures 
taken over a period of time through ESM. 
Self-Regulation 
Self-regulation is part of the executive function, which controls primarily private 
cognitions related to actions and goals of the self (Barkley, 1997; Baumeister, 2000).  
Self-regulation plays an integral role in the framework of goal-setting theory, recently 
described as one of the three most important approaches to work motivation to emerge 
over the last thirty years (Latham & Pinder, 2005).  According to this theory, goal setting 
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involves a conscious process of goal commitment and the assessment of goal progress 
through a feedback loop (Locke & Latham, 2002).  This loop allows the individual to 
assess behavior relevant to a particular goal and, if there is a misalignment, either adjust 
behavior or adjust the goal.  The process of assessment and adjustment is also known as 
self-regulation, which is best defined as “the processes by which an individual alters or 
maintains his[/her] behavioral chain in the absence of immediate external supports” (F. 
Kanfer & Karoly, 1972, p. 406).  The distinction betw en external (alpha) and internal 
(beta) regulation is important in that external “supports” or factors may also influence 
behavior, as suggested by Mischel (1977).  Self-regulation, however, refers to an internal 
process of goal-behavior alignment without external motives or influences. 
 Recently, Steel (2007) published a meta-analysis of the procrastination literature 
entitled “The Nature of Procrastination: A meta-analytic and theoretical review of 
quintessential self-regulatory failure.”  As the title of this article suggests, Steel claims 
that procrastination may represent an individual’s f ilure to regulate behavior in order to 
meet a goal.  However, two problems arise from this meta-analysis. First, the ways in 
which procrastination may represent a self-regulatory failure are not explored, nor did the 
author present a detailed account of the ways in which a self-regulation “failure” may 
occur.  A failure may occur in several ways, such as a complete lack of self-regulatory 
process activation, a breakdown in the self-regulatory process, or the interference of 
another process.  Consequently, a lack of an explanation may lead readers to believe that 
self-regulation is absent when procrastination occurs.  Second, procrastination was 
defined through conscientiousness.  Steel supported this view with meta-analytic 
evidence suggesting that procrastination represents low conscientiousness through 
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distractibility, poor organization, low achievement motivation, and a gap between 
intentions and actions.  However, defining procrastin tion through conscientiousness 
does not present a complete picture of procrastinatio .  While procrastination does 
include an element of failure to work towards an originally intended goal, which is one 
component of conscientiousness, the tendency to delay also includes elements that are not 
encompassed by conscientiousness.   
For example, procrastination does correlate with the six facets of 
conscientiousness designated by Costa and McCrae in th ir Five-Factor Model of 
personality (e.g., Costa, McCrae, & Dye, 1991), which include competence, order, 
dutifulness, achievement-striving, self-discipline, and deliberation (r = -.31 to -.75, 
Johnson & Bloom, 1995; Lay, 1997; Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995).  But procrastination is 
also related to other variables, such as boredom prneness (r = .49, p<.01; Blunt & 
Pychyl, 1998) and self-efficacy (r = -.29, p<.01; Wolters, 2003), which do not fit with the 
facets of conscientiousness listed above.  While oth r researchers have reported strong 
negative correlations between procrastination and cons ientiousness (e.g., r = -.61, p<.01; 
C. H. Lay & Brokenshire, 1997), given that the correlations are not equal to one or 
negative one after correcting for unreliability of the measures, placing procrastination and 
conscientiousness at two ends of a unidimensional scale does not offer a fully accurate 
portrayal of procrastination.   
Moreover, empirical evidence for a relationship between self-regulation and 
procrastination has been offered (Senecal, Koestner, & Vallerand, 1995), suggesting that 
procrastination does not represent a complete lack of self-regulatory processes as Steel 
(2007) may have implied.  In this study of 498 undergraduate French-Canadian students, 
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self-regulation variables accounted for 25% of the variance in academic procrastination.  
Self-regulation variables included intrinsic motivaon to know, external regulation, 
identified motivation, and amotivation.  These variables were associated with a 10-item 
self-report measure of procrastination at r = -.28, p<.01, r = -.03, n.s., r = .17, p<.01, and 
r = .26, p<.01, respectively.  Though these correlations are relatively small, these findings 
indicate that, contrary to Steel’s (2007) claim of procrastination as a failure or absence of 
the self-regulatory system, self-regulation is related to procrastination at the trait level. 
As a result, investigators have explored the ways in which self-regulation may be 
implicated during procrastination.  Baumeister (1997), for example, defined a self-
regulation failure as “a self-defeat that occurs when people’s normal systems for 
regulating and controlling their own behavior break down in systematic, standard ways” 
(p. 145).  In this theoretical article, he discussed two ways in which self-regulation failure 
may occur: underregulation and misregulation.  Underregulation includes a failure to 
adjust one’s behavior or goals such that they align, suggesting a lack of thought or 
planning dedicated towards outlining a strategy through which to reach one’s goals.  For 
example, a student may set a goal to get an A on a test, but she may neglect to outline a 
way in which to do so, which might include studying or attending review sessions.  
Misregulation, on the other hand, involves concerted efforts to align behavior and goals 
that do not result in goal attainment, suggesting that strategies were devised to assist in 
reaching one’s goals, but were not sufficiently helpful.  For example, the student with the 
goal of getting an A on a test may have devised detailed plans regarding the time and 
material she will spend studying, but encounter difficulty in trying to implement those 
plans.  Given that procrastinators generally have the same intentions to study as 
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nonprocrastinators, but fail when acting upon those intentions (Buehler et al., 1994; 
Pychyl, Morin et al., 2000; Steel, 2007), planning and strategizing methods through 
which to reach a goal do not seem to be the areas in which procrastinators have trouble.  
Rather, it appears that procrastinators lack the skills necessary for devising adequate 
plans to reach a goal and/or acting upon those plans.  Procrastination, then, may not 
represent a failure to use the self-regulatory system all together, but rather a failure for 
self-regulatory efforts to result in the originally desired performance goals. 
From a neuropsychological perspective, “if an action is under the control of a goal 
list, it should continue until the goal is satisfied; and that the failure of this process should 
trigger the search for another, more appropriate action structure” (Jeannerod, 1997, p. 
162).  In other words, once a goal-directed action has been decided upon, it should be 
pursued until the goal is met.  However, should a failure arise either in implementing the 
action or in the ability of the action to produce th  desired goal, a more appropriate action 
and/or goal will be sought.  This view suggests that failure to reach an originally intended 
goal due to procrastination would prompt the setting of a more feasible goal, which 
would require self-regulatory processes. 
This description also conveys that procrastination is a process that relies on 
controlled thoughts.  Controlled processes require an individual’s attention and are 
intentional and flexible, whereas automatic processes, in contrast, are activated 
unintentionally often by environmental cues and do not require a conscious effort 
(Devine, 1989).  Self-regulation calls upon controlled processes in order to actively set 
goals and consciously devise plans through which to reach them (F Kanfer & Stevenson, 
1985).  It appears, then, that procrastination includes controlled thoughts of self-
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regulation that are put towards goal-attainment strategies that the individual does not 
carry through.   
Self-Regulation vs. Self-Control 
An important distinction should be drawn between self-regulation and self-
control.  Many authors use the terms interchangeably (e.g., Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et 
al., 1998; Steel, 2007), but closer examination suggests that the terms represent similar 
but distinct concepts.  McCullough and Willoughby (2009) also offer insight into the 
distinction between the two in a theoretical article regarding the importance of both self-
regulation and self-control in many life domains, religion in particular.  According to the 
authors, self-regulation involves guiding or adjusting behavior in pursuit of a desired 
goal.  Though the process may not be a cognitively-controlled process in all instances, 
self-regulation is likely a deliberate thought when exerted over tasks that involve 
executive functioning, such as planning or goal striving.   
F. H. Kanfer (1977) suggested that while self-regulation implicates the internal 
processes relative to goal-behavior alignment, self-control includes exertion of self-
regulation in the context of various external influences.  Consequently, self-control 
represents a specific type of self-regulation, whereby the individual refrains from a 
particularly attractive action that may be available in a given context in order to pursue a 
goal that has greater perceived long-term gains.  Generally speaking, self-control is 
exerted in order to refrain from a particular behavior (e.g., resisting certain food cravings 
when on a diet), whereas self-regulation is exerted to produce a goal-related behavior 
(e.g., making oneself study for an upcoming exam).  Both require regulation of thoughts 
and behavior, but do so by either prompting or inhibiting behavior.  Self-control may rely 
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on the same resources necessary for self-regulation, s there is a clear overlap between 
the two processes.  Baumeister (1997) referred to self-control as the more colloquial 
term.  For present purposes, the terms self-regulation nd self-control will be used in 
keeping with the distinction provided by McCullough and Willoughby (2009).  However, 
in discussing the work of other authors, the terms will be used as those authors chose to 
use them. 
Limited-Resource Model of Self-Regulation 
The majority of research on self-regulation focuses on a limited-resource model.  
Muraven and Baumeister (2000) suggested that self-control is a limited resource which 
may be depleted, much like a muscle’s ability to do work.  In this theoretical article, self-
control was defined as “the exertion of control over the self by the self” (p. 247) and 
occurs when the person chooses to override various urges, behaviors, desires, or 
emotions.  Only a certain number of processes may be controlled at a given time, and 
once self-control has been exerted, fewer resources exist shortly thereafter to dedicate 
towards other self-control processes.  Taken together, ese restrictions suggest that a 
limited pool of resources may be dedicated towards self-control efforts.  A similar model 
may be applied to self-regulation, whereby an individual has a goal, monitors behavior 
towards the goal, wishes to align behavior with reaching the goal, and adjusts behavior or 
the goal as necessary (Carver & Scheier, 1998).  Such a process requires conscious 
cognitive effort that depletes resources for further use within the short-term.   
Empirical evidence has been provided for the limited-r source model of self-
regulation through three studies conducted in the laboratory (Muraven et al., 1998).  
Based on the assumption that engaging in self-regulation would deplete resources for 
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future tasks that might require those resources, individuals were asked to complete 
consecutive tasks that require self-regulation.  For example, three groups were compared 
on the duration of time they squeezed a handgrip, which the authors claimed is a well-
established measure of self-regulatory ability rather an physical strength, both before 
and after an affect-regulation task.  One group of articipants was asked to overtly 
express the emotions they felt while watching a sad movie, while the second group was 
asked to suppress their emotions.  These two affect-regulation groups were compared to a 
control group, which was given no instruction regarding mood expression.  Participants 
were asked to squeeze the handgrip before and after wa ching the movie.  Participants in 
the combined affect-regulation groups reported that t e instructions required more effort 
to follow than participants in the control group (t(37) = 3.59, p<.01).  Furthermore, those 
who were instructed to regulate their emotional expr ssion showed greater decline in 
handgrip duration time compared to those who were giv n no instructions regarding 
emotion regulation (t 38) = 1.98, p<.05 for suppression group and t(38) = 2.32, p<.05 for 
the over-expression group). 
Participants were also asked to report their fatigue at the beginning of the study, 
after watching the movie, and upon completion of the study.  Those who were instructed 
to regulate their emotional expression reported a gre ter increase in fatigue from before 
to after the movie than those in the no instruction group (F(1,57) = 3.84, p<.05).  These 
findings suggest that exerting self-regulatory efforts is more fatiguing than not exercising 
self-regulation.  This study was replicated with several different methods (e.g., thought 
suppression and unsolvable anagrams) to ensure that the results were not due solely to the 
ways in which self-regulation was operationalized (i.e., emotion regulation and squeezing 
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a handgrip).  Similar results were reported, suggesting that self-regulatory effort exertion 
leads to depletion of self-regulatory resources and increased reported fatigue. 
Fatigue 
Fatigue may be considered a warning signal for the over-commitment of 
resources towards a given task (Dinges, 1995; Hockey, Maule, Clough, & Bdzola, 2000).  
Individuals in the working population frequently complain of fatigue, with incidence 
rates between 22% in the Netherlands and 38% in the UK (Rook & Zijlstra, 2006).  Many 
terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, such a  sleepiness (Akerstedt, 
Fredlund, Gillberg, & Jansson, 2002b; Dinges, 1995), mental fatigue (Hockey & Earle, 
2006; Webster, Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996), and subjective fatigue (Brown & Schutte, 
2006).  In keeping with Brown and Schutte’s (2006) conceptualization of subjective 
fatigue, in which fatigue is a “pervasive sense of tiredness or lack of energy that is not 
related exclusively to exertion (p. 585), subjective fatigue will be used to refer to reported 
overall fatigue, which includes both mental and perceived physical fatigue.   
Similar to the limited resource model of self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1998; 
Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), a compensatory control m del of fatigue has been 
proposed (Hockey & Earle, 2006).  In this model, individuals compare current behaviors 
to a target goal.  If the behavior and goal do not align, the individual either increases 
effort or reduces the goal, each with different fatigue outcomes.  Hockey and Earle 
(2006) suggested that the resources necessary to maintain relative equilibrium between 
behaviors and goals draw upon the resources of the executive control system, similar to 
the self-regulatory system. 
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Support of the compensatory control model was offered by Webster et al. (1996), 
who reported that fatigue was related to the motivation l state of need for closure due to 
depleted resources for cognitive processing.  A total f 88 undergraduate students 
participated in an experiment in which fatigue was manipulated via assessment before 
class, after class, or after a two-hour exam.  Greate  f tigue was reported after the exam 
(F(1,84)=72.60, p<.01) than before or after a regular class period, an  quicker 
impressions were formed with very little effort or thought after the exam (F 1,86)=3.89, 
p<.05).  The authors concluded that fatigue serves to decrease cognitive capacity, which 
increases one’s need for closure and decreases the time it takes to form an impression.  
These findings provide support for both the compensatory-control model and previously 
reported findings that resource depletion leads to fatigue.  
Self-Regulation as a “Muscle” 
The resource depletion model of self-regulation portrays self-regulatory resources 
as similar to those of a muscle, whereby repeated us  depletes strength in the short-term.  
Over a period of time, however, repeated use of the muscle may cause its strength to 
increase.  If self-regulation does resemble a muscle, its strength ("self-regulatory 
strength"; Schmeichel & Baumeister, 2004) should increase after repeated use over time, 
either through increased resource capacity (power) or increased resistance to fatigue 
(stamina; Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999).  However, research provides mixed 
support for this hypothesis.  The research presented above by Muraven et al. (1998) only 
supports the first aspect of the analogy between self-regulation as a muscle in that self-
regulation leads to a decline in self-regulatory resources available for tasks in the near 
future.  After watching a 3-minute film clip, participants filled out a brief questionnaire 
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regarding their mood, and immediately engaged in the handgrip task.  Though the authors 
do not explicitly offer the amount of time between these events, the time lapse between 
self-regulatory exercises was likely less than thirty minutes based on the procedural 
description.  Similar to a muscle, then, repetitious use of self-regulatory resources causes 
a depletion of those resources in the short-term. 
In order to address the second aspect of the analogy between self-regulation and a 
muscle, Muraven et al. (1999) conducted a longitudinal study of college students over a 
period of two weeks.  All participants completed the handgrip task (described above) 
upon entering the study, followed by a thought suppression task and another handgrip 
measure.  This process provided a baseline of both self-regulatory strength and depletion 
for each participant.  Then, four groups were asked to perform behavioral, affective, and 
cognitive self-regulation exercises consistently over a two-week period, including 
maintaining good posture at all times, mood-regulation hrough diary entries, and keeping 
two food diaries, respectively.  A fifth group was included as a control group that was not 
given any exercises to perform over the two-week period.  At the end of two weeks, 
participants returned and performed the same sequence of handgrip, thought suppression, 
and handgrip tasks. 
After the two-week period, performance on the handgrip task before thought 
suppression remained relatively stable (statistics not offered by the authors), suggesting 
that resources available for self-regulation did not i crease after two weeks of self-
regulatory exercises.  However, relative to the control group, the decrease in performance 
on the handgrip task after thought suppression for the emaining groups was not as large 
after the two-week period (F 1,64) = 5.57, p<.05), suggesting that self-regulatory 
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exercises may have improved participants’ resistance to fatigue (stamina).  However, the 
authors also report that the performance of the control group on the handgrip task after 
thought suppression decreased substantially from the original baseline measure.  Ideally, 
the control group should perform in a relatively stable manner on the first and second 
assessments.  Thus, the reported results may be attributable to changes in the control 
group, changes in the groups that performed regular self-regulatory tasks, or both.  Taken 
together, these findings do not offer clear support for increased resources or resistance to 
fatigue after periods of repeated self-regulation. 
In summary, self-regulation is a cognitive process and/or skill set involved in goal 
setting and goal-directed behavior.  When procrastin tion occurs, self-regulatory 
processes are engaged in order to provide either a different strategy through which to 
attain the original goal or to revise the original goal.  Self-regulation calls upon a limited 
resource such that repeated self-regulation depletes available resources and leads to 
fatigue in the short-term.  Prolonged periods of self-regulation do not serve to increase 
self-regulatory capacity or resistance to fatigue.  As a result, repeated procrastination over 
a short time-period may deplete self-regulatory resources through the increased use of 
self-regulation, which may lead to increased levels of fatigue. 
The Present Study 
The present study explored an area in which procrastination frequently occurs but 
research has yet to focus: getting out of bed in the morning.  A longitudinal approach was 
taken using ESM in order to obtain a more accurate ass ssment of individuals’ waking 
tendencies, as suggested by Rushton et al. (1983) and Mischel (1977).  In the present 
study, I also assessed both self-reported and behavioral procrastination.   
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Specifically, behavioral procrastination was assessed through the alignment of the 
time at which participants get out of bed with the original goal time for which an alarm 
clock is set.  The existence and use of the “snooze” button suggests that many people 
delay getting out of bed at the originally intended time.  If individuals do not get up at the 
originally intended time, a more appropriate waking time must be set.  In the proposed 
study, the term “snooze time” refers to the time individuals spent delaying getting out of 
bed, a delay which is typically facilitated through the use of a snooze function on an 
alarm device.  Based on research presented above, if individuals procrastinate getting out 
of bed in the morning, self-regulatory processes should be engaged in order to devise a 
new goal time at which to arise. 
Self-regulation was assessed both indirectly, through the outcome variable of 
subjective fatigue measured upon waking and in the afternoon, and directly, through a 
self-report measure given at the end of the study.  Because the many self-regulation 
studies assess fatigue shortly after self-regulatory exercises (e.g., Muraven et al., 1998), 
subjective fatigue was assessed upon waking.  Fatigue assessments have not been 
obtained after several hours of self-regulation exercis s in previous research.  However, 
afternoon fatigue reports could detect potential residual associations of morning snooze 
time on reported fatigue throughout the day, and fatigue from other potentially resource 
depleting tasks.  This assessment does not offer conclusive results regarding effects of 
snooze time on daily trends in fatigue, but it does provide a first step to determining 
whether snooze time is associated with subjective fatigue throughout the day.  As a result, 
no a priori hypotheses were proposed for the afternoon assessment.   
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As discussed above, research has not provided support for increased resource 
capacity or resistance to fatigue resulting from repeated self-regulatory exercises over 
time.  Accordingly, it was not expected that indiviuals who regularly delay getting out 
of bed differ from individuals who do not delay getting out of bed in their capacity for 
self-regulation or resistance to fatigue after self-r gulatory processes that may be engaged 
due to snooze time.  More simply, while individual se f-regulatory differences may be 
present, based on research to date, they are not likely to be attributable to differences in 
capacity or fatigue resistance that result from repeated delay of getting out of bed over 
time.  Therefore, individuals who regularly procrastinate getting out of bed were 
recruited. 
The relationship between procrastination and self-regulation was explored by 
measuring the snooze time of individuals in two groups each morning for three weeks, 
and altering the snooze time for individuals in one group during one week.  Individuals in 
the experimental group were asked to report their regular snooze time for a five-day 
period, then they were instructed to minimize snooze time for the next five-day period.  
Individuals were then allowed to return to their prefe red waking process during the final 
five-day period.  During this final week, it was expected that individuals would revert to 
snoozing after the alarm first rings in the morning.  The control group reported regular 
snooze times each morning for all three weeks.  Individuals in both groups reported the 
number of hours slept each night, as this factor is likely to be an additional contributor to 
subjective morning fatigue.  The following set of predictions was explored.  Hypotheses 
2 and 3 refer to the experimental group alone, and all other hypotheses refer to the 
experimental and control groups combined. 
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H1: Trait procrastination will be positively associated with snooze time during Weeks 1 
and 3 (anticipated r = .55, f2 = .30).  
H2: After statistically controlling for the number of hours slept, snooze time will be 
positively associated to subjective morning fatigue (anticipated r = .50, f2 = .25). 
H3: After statistically controlling for the number of hours slept, subjective morning 
fatigue scores will be lower during Week 2 than during Week 1 (anticipated d =-.40).   
H4: After statistically controlling for the number of hours slept, subjective morning 
fatigue scores reported during Week 3 will be greater than subjective morning fatigue 
during Week 2 (anticipated d =.40). 
In addition to exploring individuals’ procrastination and self-regulation tendencies 
when working towards a goal, the current study alsoexplored individuals’ motivation 
orientation towards setting and approaching goals.  E liot and McGregor (2001) 
developed a 2x2 achievement goal framework that describes four types of goal 
orientations along two axes of mastery-performance and approach-avoidance.  This 
framework was based on previous development of a mastery-performance dichotomy 
(e.g., Ames & Archer, 1988) and the more recent application of the approach-avoidance 
axis to performance orientation (e.g., Elliot & Church, 1997).  Elliot and McGregor 
(2001) further delineated the relationship between th se goal approaches by 
differentiating between approach and avoidance on one axis, and mastery and 
performance on the other.  The resulting model consists of four quadrants which combine 
each orientation axis: mastery-approach, mastery-avoid nce, performance-approach, and 
performance-avoidance.  In this framework, individuals with a mastery goal orientation 
focus on gaining the skills and understanding required by various tasks, whereas 
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individuals with a performance goal orientation focus on achieving a positive evaluation 
of their performance in relation to others.  Indiviuals with an approach orientation are 
more likely to take on goals they find challenging with the hopes of achieving success, 
whereas those with an avoidance orientation are more likely to avoid tasks that might be 
challenging in order to avoid potential failure.   
Little research has been conducted to explore the ways in which these goal 
orientations may be related to procrastination, and only trait procrastination has been 
explored thus far.  Wolters (2003) explored the relationship of the trichotomous 
framework of mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoidance orientation 
with academic procrastination in undergraduate students.  Students with greater mastery 
orientation were less likely to procrastinate their academic work (r = -.32, p<.01).  
Additionally, students with a greater tendency to pr crastinate also reported greater 
performance-approach orientation (r = .29, p<.01) and performance-avoidance 
orientation (r = .22, p<.01).  The present study explored the relationship between goal 
orientation and procrastination, expanding upon the work of Wolters (2003) by including 
all four quadrants of the 2x2 framework suggested by Elliot and McGregor (2001).  
However, a priori hypotheses were only proposed with respect to trait procrastination and 
the performance-mastery axis.  Exploratory analyses examined the relationship between 
each orientation and snooze time during Weeks 1 and 3, as well as the time spent in bed 
awake before arising in Weeks 1 and 3.  The following predictions were explored. 
H5: Trait procrastination will be negatively related to mastery orientation (anticipated r 
= -.28). 
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H6: Trait procrastination will be positively related to performance orientation 
(anticipated r = .27). 
Other contributors to subjective fatigue 
Several measures were included to assess other variables that may potentially 
contribute to subjective fatigue.  Fatigue upon waking may result from several factors 
aside from self-regulation, such as sleep disturbance or time-of-day preferences.  
Additionally, trait negative affect is associated with both procrastination and subjective 
fatigue and may contribute to morning fatigue scores.  These three variables were 
assessed through self-report measures.  Although these variables are likely to influence 
morning fatigue scores, it was not expected that they would affect the rank order of 
fatigue scores that may be reported over the three-week period. 
Sleep Disturbance. Akerstedt and colleagues have conducted several studie  
which assess the relationship of sleep disturbance d fatigue.  Akerstedt et al. (2004) 
reported that sleep disturbance predicted fatigue in 5720 employed adults in Sweden 
(odds ratio 4.31; 95% confidence interval 3.50-5.45).  While it is not surprising that high 
levels of sleep disturbance are likely associated with high levels of fatigue, fatigue is also 
likely to fluctuate in accordance with other contributing factors.  To assess the changes in 
fatigue that may be attributable to general sleep troubles, the first four items of the 
Karolinska Sleep Questionnaire (Akerstedt, Fredlund, Gillberg, & Jansson, 2002a; 
Akerstedt et al., 2004) were included as a measure of g neral sleep disturbance.  The 
following set of predictions were assessed. 
H7: Sleep disturbance will be positively associated with trait fatigue (anticipated r = .60). 
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H8: Sleep disturbance will be positively associated with subjective morning fatigue 
(anticipated r = between .35 and.45, f2 = .16). 
Time-of-Day Preference. Procrastination may be related to the circadian rhythm 
of an individual, which determines to a certain extent the best and/or worst time of day 
for social, emotional, and intellectual functioning.  Hess, Sherman, and Goodman (2000) 
reported that academic procrastination among 107 undergraduate students was positively 
associated with “eveningness,” or the propensity to engage in tasks during the evening (r 
= .38, p<.01)1.  Dinges (1995) also reported that fatigue may fluctuate naturally over the 
course of the day due to the processes underlying an individual’s circadian rhythm.  This 
research is of particular interest, as it relates a biological factor to procrastination, a 
variable known thus far to only have cognitive, behavioral, and affective components.  In 
addition, this line of research sheds light on subjective fatigue through the lens of 
circadian rhythm and individuals’ propensity for performing tasks at various times of 
day.  The Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire was included to assess whether 
reports of fatigue vary depending on time-of-day prefe ence as a function of circadian 
rhythm.  Higher scores on this questionnaire indicate a greater preference for completing 
tasks in the morning, whereas lower scores indicate a preference for completing tasks in 
the evening.  The following set of predictions was as essed. 
H9: Eveningness will be negatively associated with trait procrastination (anticipated r=-
.35). 
H10: Eveningness will be negatively associated withsubjective morning fatigue 
(anticipated r = between -.35 and -.45).  
                                                
1 Hess et al. (2000) reversed the scoring of the MEQ, such that higher scores reflected a greater preferenc  
for completing tasks in the evening. 
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Researchers with a large-scale European research network (www.euclock.org) 
have recently developed another measure to assess the human circadian rhythm based on 
over 55,000 European participants (see Roenneberg, Wi z-Justice, & Merrow, 2003; 
Wirz-Justice, 2007).  An individual’s chronotype, or time-of-day preference, is discerned 
by the mid-sleep time point on free days (MSF), which is calculated as the mid-point 
between when an individual goes to sleep and when he/she wakes up.  An earlier MSF 
(e.g., 3am) indicates more of a morning chronotype han a later MSF (e.g., 7am) because 
an earlier MSF indicates that an individual went to be early and woke up early.  This time 
point is chosen from free days because people are less constrained on these days by social 
or work obligations that may influence sleep schedul s.  Moreover, sleep habits on free 
days are likely dependent on sleep deficits that may build during the work week, as well 
as exposure to sunlight (Roenneberg et al., 2003).  The Münich Chronotype 
Questionnaire (MCTQ) measures these variables, allowing researchers to correct MSF 
based on these values.  Therefore, the MCTQ may provide a more accurate measure of 
time of day preferences because chronotype is determin d based on both the individual’s 
preferences and external factors.  This measure was given in addition to the MEQ to 
assess participants’ time-of-day preferences. 
Affect. Affect refers to an individual’s subjective emotions and feelings (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1998).  Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) distinguished between two 
dimensions of affect in the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale measure (PANAS).  
Positive affect (PA) refers to a state of high energy, concentration, and engagement, 
whereas negative affect (NA) reflects a state of subjective distress and unpleasurable 
engagement.  Positive and negative affect are measur d by two scales representing 
 26  
separate dimensions, and individuals may report similar levels of positive and negative 
affect simultaneously.  Watson et al. (1988) reported that, among an adult sample, both 
trait and state NA were strongly associated with extant measures of distress and 
depression, such as the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; rs between .65 and .74) and 
the Beck Depression Inventory (rs between .56 and .58).  The PA scale was negatively 
correlated with these measures, but not as strongly (e.g., rs between -.19 and -.29 for the 
HSCL)2. 
Procrastination has been studied as both a correlate and a consequence of affect.  
An individual’s trait affect may influence his/her general inclination to procrastinate, or 
alternatively, procrastination may cause an affectiv  reaction (Stainton, Lay, & Flett, 
2000).  As discussed above, Pychyl et al. (2000) did not find significant relationships 
between positive or negative affect and procrastinatio  behavior in-the-moment.  Lay 
(1997), however, reported a significant relationship between self-reported trait 
procrastination and trait negative affect (r = .31, p<.01).  Similarly, Steel, Brothen, and 
Wambach (2001) reported significant relationships between procrastination and both 
positive and negative affect (r = -.34 and r = .34, p<.05, respectively).  Taken together, 
these results suggest a relationship between procrastination and affect at the trait level but 
not at the state level.   
Negative affect is also implicated in both state and trait subjective fatigue.  
Hockey et al. (2000) measured individuals’ state aff ct through measures of subjective 
fatigue and anxiety, suggesting that affect, fatigue, and anxiety are closely related.  
Similarly, in an assessment of subjective fatigue both before and after SAT tests of 
varying lengths, Ackerman, Kanfer, and Wolman (2008) found that the trait complex of 
                                                
2 Watson et al. (1988) do not offer p-values for these correlations but stated that theyw re significant. 
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neuroticism/anxiety was significantly associated with pre-test subjective fatigue (rs 
between .22 and .31, p<.01) as well as post-test subjective fatigue (rs between .31 and 
.38, p<.01).  These findings offer support for a relationship between subjective fatigue 
and negative affect at both the state and trait levels.   
An inverse relationship appears to exist between subjective fatigue and positive 
affect.  For example, Angus and Heslegrave (1985) conducted a sleep-deprivation 
experiment with undergraduate students over a three-day period, assessing positive and 
negative affect every hour.  Results indicated a significant decline in positive affect 
(F(8,40) = 30.32, p<.01) over the course of the study, in a pattern that closely mirrored 
the increase in reported subjective fatigue.  Participants also reported an increase in 
negative affect (F(8,40) = 35.08, p<.01) over the three-day period.  These results suggest 
a relationship between subjective fatigue and affect at the state level.  The following set 
of predictions regarding positive and negative affect were assessed. 
H11: Trait procrastination will be positively associated with trait negative affect 
(anticipated r = .30). 
H12: Trait procrastination will be negatively associated with trait positive affect  
(anticipated r =- .30). 
H13: Trait subjective fatigue will be positively associated with trait negative affect 
(anticipated r = .45). 
H14: Trait negative affect will be positively associated with subjective morning fatigue 
(anticipated r = .40, f2 = .16 ). 
H15: Trait subjective fatigue will be negatively associated with positive affect  
(anticipated r =- .45). 
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H16: Trait positive affect will be negatively associated with subjective morning fatigue 
(anticipated r = -.40, f2 = .16). 
In summary, several factors may contribute to reported morning subjective 
fatigue, including sleep disturbance, eveningness preferences, and negative affect.  These 
variables were included in order to determine the influence they may have on average 
subjective morning fatigue scores for each week.  As stated above, however, they were 
not expected to influence the rank order of fatigue scores over the three-week period.    
 
 




 Undergraduate students from the Georgia Institute of Technology were recruited 
through an Internet recruiting tool (Experimetrix), flyers around campus, and in-class 
announcements.  Students were included if they usedan alarm device to awaken each 
weekday morning, used the snooze function on their alarm devices at least once per 
weekday morning, were proficient with the English language, and had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision and hearing.  Students received up to 5 research credits for 
participating.   
 A series of a priori power analyses at the .90 level indicated that 75 experimental 
participants would provide enough power to detect the smallest hypothesized effects.  A 
total of 80 experimental participants enrolled in the current study.  Of these, 47 
participants were women (58.75%) and 33 were men (41.25%).  The average age was 
20.38 (sd = 1.42).   
Based on trends from preliminary pilot studies, a control group was added for 
several reasons.  First, because this study was condu ted several times throughout the 
Fall 2009 semester, it is possible that participants may have had academic commitments 
which altered sleep patterns and fatigue (e.g., a week of midterms).  Any changes in 
sleeping patterns or fatigue ratings in the control g up that mimicked that of the 
experimental group might illuminate which weeks were particularly laden with academic 
requirements.  Second, a control group would allow f r the exploration of whether the 
experimental manipulation of restricting morning snooze time would have residual 
 30  
effects during the final week of the study.  A total of 39 control participants enrolled in 
the current study.  Of these, 19 participants were women (48.7%) and 20 were men 
(51.3%) and the average age was 20.51 (sd = 2.04). 
Two participants (1 experimental and 1 control) withdrew from the study, 
reporting that they were too busy to participate.  Of these 2 participants, the experimental 
participant scored 3 standard deviations above other participants on the measure of trait 
negative affect.  This participant’s trait scores fll within the range of plus or minus 3 
standard deviations of the group mean for all other rait measures, and the control 
participant fell within this range for all trait measures.  These 2 participants are not 
included in the statistical analyses. 
In addition, several participants answered “no” to questions presented in the self-
report measures regarding several of the inclusion criteria.  For example, the Münich 
Chronotype Questionnaire asks whether participants use an alarm clock to awaken on 
school days.  Two control participants answered “no.”  Similarly, the Snooze Usage 
Questionnaire asks how many times participants press the snooze button on an average 
morning.  Four control participants answered “zero,” one of which also answered “no” to 
using an alarm clock to awaken on school days.  As the e are requirements to be included 
in the study, these 5 participants were excluded from statistical analyses.  These control 
participants did differ significantly from other control participants on two of the 
measured traits: self-control/self-regulation (t(37)= 2.98, p<.01, d = .98) and mean 
performance approach (t(37) = 2.38, p<.05, d = .78).     
Finally, 2 participants (1 control and 1 experimental) reported illness during Week 
2 of the study which might have affected sleep patterns and fatigue (e.g., mononucleosis 
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and the swine flu).  These participants did not differ rom others on global trait measures.    
Additionally, paired t-tests comparing each participant’s daily fatigue scores in Weeks 1, 
2, and 3 indicate that they did not report significantly different morning fatigue or 
afternoon fatigue.  However, the experimental participant reported length of nap time 
during Week 2 that was greater than 3 standard deviations from the mean nap length of 
other experimental participants during that week.  Similarly, the control participant 
reported snooze time during Week 3 that was 3 standard eviations from mean snooze 
time of other control participants during that week.  Because these participants exhibited 
different snoozing and napping patterns when compared cross weeks and compared to 
other participants, these participants will not be included in the statistical analyses.  
Consequently, the final sample consisted of 32 control participants and 78 experimental 
participants (N = 110).   
Procedure 
 The present study followed an A-B-A, within-subjects design in which all 
participants took part in all three weeks of the study.  Data collection began in September 
2009 and ended in November of 2009, during which three sessions were conducted.  As a 
result, participants were assessed at different points in the semester.  Each session was 
scheduled such that it would not conflict with any university holidays.  
 Students signed up for an initial one-hour Saturday lab session via Experimetrix, 
and could choose one of three session times at which t ey would complete this session.  
These three session times were used to assign groups of participants to the experimental 
or control group, and participants did not know to which group they were assigned until 
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they arrived at the lab session.  The experimental and control conditions differed with 
respect to the alarm devices used and awakening instructions during Week 2 of the study.   
Informed consent was obtained at the beginning of this one-hour lab session 
before instructions were given regarding study logistics and accessing the online 
questionnaires.  Participants then completed self-report questionnaires assessing 
procrastination, fatigue, general sleep patterns and snooze function usage, goal 
orientation, and various personality traits.  A description of each measure used in the 
study is included below.  These questionnaires tookapproximately 30-45 min to 
complete.   
Extensive information regarding how to access the online questionnaires and 
when to complete them was provided.  Each participant w s given a note card with the 
website address of the online questionnaires, as well as an individual user name and 
password.  The online questionnaires were to be completed 15 times per week.  Starting 
on Sunday evenings, participants completed questionna res in the evening, morning, and 
afternoon through Friday afternoon.  The morning questionnaire was to be completed 
within 30 min of getting out of bed, the afternoon questionnaire was to be completed 
between 2pm and 4pm, and the evening questionnaire w s to be completed before going 
to bed.   
The experimental group received an alarm clock withou  a snooze button to use 
during the second week of the study.  Participants in his group received a brief 
demonstration and a page of instructions detailing how to use this alarm.  An opportunity 
was offered for participants to try using the alarms and ask questions about them at this 
time.  Experimental participants were instructed to use their usual alarm device and 
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snooze function during Week 1 (Monday-Friday) of the study and to awaken as they 
typically do.  During Week 2, participants were instructed to use the study alarm and to 
get out of bed as soon as the alarm first rings.  Participants were asked to use only the 
study alarm to awaken during this week, although they were permitted to set a back-up 
alarm if they were concerned about setting the study alarm properly.  They were also 
advised to set the alarm for the time at which they wish to arise in order to minimize time 
spent in bed after the alarm ringing and before getting out of bed.  During Week 3, 
participants were asked to return to their normal alarm and snooze function usage.  They 
were not allowed to use the study alarm during this final week.  The control group did not 
receive an alarm device and was instructed to use their normal alarm devices and snooze 
functions for the duration of the study.  
At the end of the third week, participants attended a brief lab session to complete 
a final questionnaire, return the study alarm, and receive a debriefing statement.  If 
participants had a scheduling conflict with either lab session, alternative arrangements 
were made, including completing aspects via email or during the week.  The entire 
duration of the study was approximately 4.5 hours. 
In order to reduce the number of missing online questionnaires, three steps were 
taken.  First, participants received a study calendar to aid in keeping track of which 
questionnaires to complete on which days.  Second, reminder e-mails were sent to 
participants on each day an online questionnaire was to be completed.  These e-mails 
included the website address of the questionnaires, as well as a way for participants to 
look up their IDs and passwords.  Finally, research c edit was pro-rated such that 
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participants received .067 research credits for each online questionnaire completed, and 1 
research credit for each lab session completed. 
Measures 
 Three types of measures were administered during the course of this study, 
including global trait measures, daily measures, and a retrospective final questionnaire, 
each of which will be discussed in turn below.  Table 1 contains the means, standard 
deviations, and coefficient α values for all global trait measures completed during the 
first lab session.  Nunnally (1978) indicated that reliability of .80 or higher is adequate 
for well-established measures, and .70 or higher is acceptable for newer measures.  
Internal consistency estimates for the global measures were above .70 for all measures 
except one (α = .67).  The internal consistency for the majority of the trait measures (14 
of 21) was greater than .80.   
Global Measures 
 General snooze function usage.  Participants reported their general snooze 
function usage, including how many times they press the snooze button on an average 
morning, how long they spend in bed asleep after thi alarms initially go off, and how 
their snooze usage might affect any roommates they have.  This measure was included to 
obtain a broad portrayal of participants’ snoozing habits, as well as to ensure that 
participants met inclusion criteria.  Tables 2 and 3 display descriptive statistics and 
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Table 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Observed Internal Consistency for all Trait Measures 
 
        Variables           # of Items        M                SD                      α 
Procrastination 15 2.73   .76 .86 
Performance 
Approach 
3 4.50   .96 .82 
Mastery 
Avoidance 
3 4.08   .87 .67 
Mastery 
Approach 
3 4.60   .80 .73 
Performance 
Avoidance 
3 4.43 1.03 .71 
Overall Fatigue 11 3.20   .93 .90 
Physical Fatigue 7 3.36   .98 .88 
Mental Fatigue 4 2.92 1.13 .82 
Sleep Disturbance 4 2.43    .72 .70 
Morningness-
Eveningness 
19 2.16   .39 .76 
Positive Affect 9 5.30   .93 .86 
Negative Affect 10 2.82   .98 .86 
Conscientiousness 10 4.28   .71 .84 
Impulse Control 9 4.09   .69 .77 
Extraversion 10 3.77   .96 .91 
Neuroticism 10 2.77   .82 .87 
Resourcefulness 9 4.32   .73 .85 
Self-Regulation 
/Self-Control 
11 3.85   .71 .76 
Perfectionism 9 4.14   .82 .84 
Curiosity 10 4.33   .64 .80 
Anxiety 9 3.56   .83 .86 
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Table 2  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for Self-Reported General Snooze Function Usage 
 
 
 Condition                    Item                    M                          SD 
Experimental  Snooze Buttona 2.46  1.22 
 




Snooze Buttona 2.19  1.06 
 Snooze Timeb 17.81 12.81 
 
Note. aSnooze button measured in number of times the snooze button was pressed per 




Table 3  
 
Alarm Setting and Roommate Information as Percentage of the Sample  
 
      Item 
 
          SAW                  RMT                   AARa                      SARa 
  
Group      Yes     No           Yes     No         Yes     No    Unsure    Yes    No    
Unsure 
 
Experimental     51.3    48.7         84.6   15.4        17.9    46.2    20.5      15.4    48.7     
20.5                    
(n = 78) 
 
Control     43.8   56.3          84.4   15.6       21.9    37.5    25.0      12.5    46.9     
25.0 
(n=32) 
Note. SAW = set alarm on weekends; RMT = one or more roommate; AAR = alarm 
awaken roommate(s); SAR = usage of snooze function affect roommate(s). 
aPercentages listed as valid percentages of those who answered “yes” to RMT. 
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On average, participants in both the experimental and control groups reported 
pressing the snooze button a little over two times p r morning and snoozing for 
approximately 17 min after the alarm first rings.  Approximately half of the participants 
in the experimental and control groups reported setting heir alarms on weekends.  The 
majority of participants reported having one or more roommate(s), and also reported that 
their alarm usage generally did not awaken or affect their roommate(s).  A copy of this 
measure is included in Appendix A. 
 Procrastination.  Procrastination was assessed using Adult Inventory of 
Procrastination (AIP; McCown & Johnson, 1989a; 1989b, cited in Ferrari et al., 1995), 
which assesses procrastination of everyday tasks such, ch as paying bills, arriving on 
time to appointments, and routine car maintenance.  The AIP consists of 15 items, 7 of 
which are reverse scored.  Responses were given on a 6-point scale indicating whether 
respondents strongly disagree (1) or strongly agree (6) with each statement.  An overall 
score represents a measure of the individual’s global procrastination, with lower scores 
indicating a lower tendency to procrastinate.  The wording of two items was slightly 
altered from pertaining to “appointments” to “engagements” to include the many types of 
appointments students may encounter.  The internal consistency found in this study (α = 
.86) is consistent with previous findings reported by McCown and Johnson (α = .79; 
1989b).  A copy of this measure is provided in Appendix B.   
 Achievement Goal Orientation.  The Achievement Goal Orientation 
Questionnaire (Elliot & McGregor, 2001) was given to assess participants’ goal 
orientation along two axes: performance-mastery and approach-avoidance dimensions.  
This questionnaire consists of 12 items, with three it ms pertaining to each of the four 
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quadrants of possible goal orientations.  Questions f cused on goals within a college 
setting, such as GPA, course learning, and comparison among college students.  
Responses were given on a 6-point scale ranging from Very UNTRUE of me (1) to Very 
TRUE of me (6).   
The internal consistencies of these subscales are som what lower than that 
reported by Elliot and McGregor (2001).  In the current study, the coefficient alpha was 
adequate for performance approach (α = .82), but was somewhat lower for mastery 
approach (α = .73), performance avoidance (α =.71), and mastery avoidance (α = .67).  
Collapsing across the various dimensions did not yield higher internal consistencies, 
suggesting that each scale does measure a distinct co struct and that the scales should not 
be combined.  Coefficient alpha values obtained in Elliot and McGregor’s (2001) 
research were relatively higher, with α = .89 for mastery-avoidance, α = .87 for mastery-
approach, α = 92 for performance-approach, and α = .83 for performance-avoidance.  
However, the questions in the Elliot and McGregor (2001) version pertained only to one 
college course, whereas the questions in the current study referred to feelings regarding 
college courses in general.  It seems likely that students would have greater variability in 
responses regarding many courses than responses regarding just one course, which would 
decrease the internal consistency of each 3-item measur .  A copy of this measure is 
provided in Appendix C. 
Fatigue.  The fatigue scale developed by (Chalder et al., 1993) was used to assess 
both trait and state subjective fatigue.  Trait fatigue will be discussed here, and state 
fatigue will be discussed below with the daily online measures.  The original version of 
this scale consists of 14 items, with 6 items assessing mental fatigue and 8 items 
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assessing physical fatigue.  Responses were given in yes/no form.  For the current study, 
3 items were removed due to vagueness.  Additionally, the response-scale was altered to 
be consistent with the other trait measures given.  The measure used in the current study 
consists of 11 items, 4 pertaining to mental symptos f fatigue and 7 pertaining to 
physical symptoms.  Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed 
or disagreed with each statement on a 6-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to 
Strongly Agree (6).  Scores on each subscale were obtained by summing the item scores 
within each scale.  A composite score of overall fatigue was obtained by summing the 
scores on all items.  Higher scores indicated greate  subjective fatigue.  Similar to results 
reported by Chalder et al. (1993), adequate alpha coeffi ients were obtained in the current 
study for both the physical (α = .90) and mental (.82) subscales, as well as the overall 
measure of subjective fatigue (α = .88).  A copy of this measure is provided in Appendix 
D. 
Sleep Disturbance.  The Karolinska Sleep Questionnaire (KSQ; Akerstedt et al., 
2002a; Akerstedt et al., 2004) was included to assess g neral sleep disturbance.  This 
measure consists of four items: difficulties falling asleep, disturbed sleep, repeated 
awakening, and premature awakening.  Responses were giv n on a 5-point scale ranging 
from Never (1) to Very Often (5), and higher scores indicated greater sleep disturbance.  
The internal consistency obtained in the current study (α = .70) is similar to the alpha 
coefficient of .76 reported by Akerstedt et al. (200 a; 2004).  Though an internal 
consistency between .70 and .79 is thought of as somewhat low, it does fall within the 
accepted range for a relatively new scale (Nunnally, 1978).  A copy of this measure is 
provided in Appendix E. 
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Time-of-Day Preferences.  Two measures were used to assess variations in daily 
functioning and time-of-day preferences attributable to an individual’s circadian rhythm.  
The Morningness-Eveningness Questionnaire (MEQ) was originally developed by Öquist 
(1970) and adapted by Horne and Östberg (1976) for English-speaking participants.  
Results from Posey and Ford (1981) suggests that this version is also valid among US 
college students.  The MEQ consists of 19 items regarding individual preferences 
towards time of waking and going to bed, physical and mental performance, and alertness 
after waking and before bed.  Scores from each item are summed and the total scores 
range from Extreme Eveningness (16) to Extreme Morningness (86). 
Based on the suggestion of several investigators (Adan & Almirall, 1991; 
Neubauer, 1992), the response format was altered fo several of the items.  The original 
scale restricts the range of times offered for participants to choose from on several items 
(e.g., “Indicate between 8pm and 3am when you are most likely to go to bed.”), which 
resulted in skewed responses.  A more open-ended response format was offered in the 
current study for Questions 1, 2, and 10 that is similar to Questions 17 and 18 in allowing 
participants to choose from any time of the day.  Response scales to other items typically 
include three or four options for participants to choose from, and the responses are scored 
based on Horne and Östberg’s (1976) scoring rubric.   
The internal consistency obtained in the current study was adequate at α = .76 and 
consistent with previous findings of α=.80 (Hess et al., 2000).  Adan and Almirall (1991) 
proposed a reduced version of the MEQ which contains 5 of the original 19 items, to 
focus on the Morningness dimension in a broader population of both students and 
working adults.  However, these 5 items yielded lower internal consistency in the present 
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study than the original 19-item scale (α =.58).  This low value is not surprising given that 
the reduced scale was proposed for a broader population than was used in the current 
study, as well as the fact that coefficient alpha is influenced by the number of items in a 
given scale (Cronbach, 1951).  A Spearman correlation suggested that the rank ordering 
of individuals on both scales was relatively similar (r = .87, p<.01).  Additionally, the 
total values on both the original and reduced scale, which could be used to classify 
individuals into morning or evening “types”, fall within the “Moderately Evening Type” 
category (Moriginal = 32.46, sd = 5.95; Mreduced = 11.71, sd = 3.11).  These values along 
with the strong correlation between the two scales suggest that both classify individuals 
in a similar manner.  Based on the stronger reliability, the original 19-item scale will be 
used in the present study.  A copy of this measure may be found in Appendix F. 
The Münich Chronotype Questionnaire (MCTQ) was used as a second measure to 
increase the construct validity of time-of-day prefe nce measurement in the current 
study.  This self-report measure consists of 16 questions regarding sleeping and waking 
habits on work days and on free days, as well as time spent in sunlight during the day in 
order to assess an individual’s time-of-day preference, or chronotype.  The mid-sleep 
time point during free days (MSF) was moderately correlated with the MEQ (r = -.50, 
p<.01), which aligns with previous findings (Zavada, Gordijn, Beersma, Daan, & 
Roenneberg, 2005).  This correlation suggests that individuals who reported greater 
morningness tendencies on the MEQ also reported earlier (e.g., 3am or 4am) mid-sleep 
time points on free days.  Similarly, the mid-sleep time point during school days (MSS) 
was moderately correlated with the MEQ (r = -.41, p<.01).  These findings support the 
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construct validity of the MEQ in that it is related to sleep patterns on free days and on 
school days.  A copy of this measure is provided in Appendix G. 
Affect.  Trait affect was assessed with the Positive Affect and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988).  The original sc le consists of 20 adjective, 10 of 
which pertain to positive affect (PA) and the other 10 of which pertain to negative affects 
(NA).  One item was removed from the PA scale (l rt), as it overlaps with items in the 
MEQ and CFS.  Responses were given on an 8-point scale ranging from Not at All (1) to 
Extremely (8).  The scale is bi-dimensional, as PA and NA have been shown to be 
qualitatively different constructs (Watson et al., 1988).  As a result, higher scores on each 
scale indicate higher levels of that particular affect.  The internal consistencies of both 
scales were adequate, with α = .86 for both PA and NA.  These findings are consistent 
with previous research by Watson et al. (1988), in which the alpha coefficients were α = 
.90 for PA and between .84 and .87 for NA.  A copy f this measure is provided in 
Appendix H. 
Personality Measures 
 Several personality measures from the International Personality Item Pool 
(http://ipip.ori.org; Goldberg et al., 2006) were included to assess the construct validity of 
procrastination and also to assess levels of trait self-regulation.  These scales include 
Conscientiousness, Impulse Control, Extraversion, Neuroticism, Resourcefulness, Self-
Regulation/ Self-Control, Perfectionism, Curiosity, and Anxiety, for a total of 87 items.  
Items were presented in random order such that items from each scale were not presented 
together, and responses were given on a 6-point scale ranging from Very UNTRUE of me 
(1) to Very TRUE of me (6).  Internal consistencies obtained in the current study are 
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compared to those presented on the website for each IPIP scale.  A copy of each 
personality scale is provided in Appendix I 
Conscientiousness.  A 10-item scale of conscientiousness was used.  Revers  
scoring was applied to 4 of these items.  The alpha coefficient obtained in the current 
study of α = .84 was similar to the recorded α = .79.  Additionally, conscientiousness has 
been shown to be moderately and negatively correlated with procrastination (e.g., Lay, 
1997; Lay, Kovacs, & Danto, 1998; C. H. Lay & Brokenshire, 1997; Lee, Kelly, & 
Edwards, 2006), and this finding was replicated in the current study with a moderate 
negative correlation between this scale and the AIP (r = -.59, p<.01).   
Impulse Control.  A 9-item scale of impulse control was included, with 7 of the 9 
items reverse-scored.  The internal consistency of this measure was α =.77, which aligns 
with the recorded α of .78.  Several studies have investigated the relationship between 
impulsivity and procrastination (e.g., Ferrari & Tice, 2000; Johnson & Bloom, 1995; 
Schouwenburg & Lay, 1995), reporting correlations between r = .26 and .40.  It should 
be noted that impulsivity is the opposite of impulse control, which was assessed in the 
current study.  Findings here align with previous re ults, with a moderately negative 
correlation between impulse control and the AIP (r = -.28, p<.01).   
Extraversion.  A 10-item scale of extraversion was included.  Half of the items are 
reverse-scored.  The alpha coefficient found in the current study of α = .91 is consistent 
with the recorded α of .87.  Previous studies have reported a range of correlations 
between extraversion and procrastination from not significant (Dewitte & Schouwenburg, 
2002) to moderately negative (Milgram & Tenne, 2000).  A nonsignificant relationship 
was found in current study between extraversion and procrastination (r = -.09, ns).   
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Neuroticism.  Neuroticism was assessed with a 10-item scale, with 5 items 
reverse-scored.  The internal consistency in the current study of α = .87 is similar to with 
the reported α of .86.  Research has demonstrated a small to moderate relationship 
between neuroticism and procrastination (e.g., Lay,1997; Lee et al., 2006; Milgram & 
Tenne, 2000), a finding which was also replicated in the current study.  A moderate 
relationship between this measure of neuroticism and the AIP was found (r = .36, p<.01).  
Self-Regulation/Self-Control.  An 11-item scale was used to assess self-
regulation/self-control, 6 of which are reverse-scored.  The internal consistency found in 
the current study (α = .76) is consistent with the reported α of .75.  This measure was 
included to assess participants’ level of trait self-r gulation, as self-regulatory processes 
are proposed to occur during procrastination but are not directly assessed in the current 
study.  Howell and Watson (2007) reported moderate negative correlations between 
procrastination and metacognitive and cognitive strategies (which include planning, 
monitoring, organization, rehearsing, elaboration, and regulating), such that individuals 
with greater tendencies to procrastinate report less use of cognitive and metacognitive 
strategies.  A negative correlation was also found in the present study between this scale 
of self-regulation/self-control and the AIP (r = -.66, p<.01).  This finding suggests that, at 
the trait level, individuals who have a greater tendency to procrastinate have less of a 
tendency to engage in self-regulation or self-control.   
Resourcefulness.  The resourcefulness scale used in the current study contains 9 
items, 4 of which are reverse-scored.  An adequate alpha coefficient of α = .85 was found 
in the current study, similar to the reported α of .83.  This measure was included to 
provide convergent validity for the self-regulation/self-control measure described above, 
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as both self-regulation and resourcefulness represent types of metacognitive strategies 
(Wolters, 2003).  As expected, a moderate positive relationship was found between 
resourcefulness and the self-regulation/self-control scale (r = .40, p<.01).  Researchers 
have also reported a moderate negative correlation between resourcefulness and 
procrastination (r = -.30; Milgram, Dangour, & Raviv, 1992), a finding which was 
replicated in the current study between resourcefuln ss and the AIP (r = -.36, p<.01).   
Perfectionism.  A 9-item scale was used to assess perfectionism.  Two of the 
items were reverse-scored.  An adequate internal consistency was found in the present 
study (α = .84) compared to the reported α of .76.  Past research has reported a positive 
correlation between self-oriented perfectionism andprocrastination (e.g., Flett, 
Blankstein, & Martin, 1995; Flett, Hewitt, & Martin, 1995); however, a negative 
correlation was found in the current study between p rfectionism and the AIP (r = -.24, 
p<.05).   
Curiosity.  Curiosity was assessed with a 10-item scale, with only ne of the items 
reverse-scored.  The alpha coefficient found in the present study (α = .80) is consistent 
with the reported α of .78.  This scale was included based on past resea ch exploring the 
relationship between procrastination and openness to experience, which includes 
intellectual curiosity and openness (e.g., Steel, 2007).  Similar to previous findings, a 
nonsignificant relationship was found in the present study between curiosity and the AIP 
(r = .01, ns).   
Anxiety.  A 9-item scale was used in assessing anxiety, and 2 of these items were 
reverse-scored.  The internal consistency of this scale was strong with α = .86, which is 
consistent the reported α = .80.  Previous research has found a small to moderate positive 
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relationship between procrastination and anxiety (Milgram et al., 1992; Solomon & 
Rothblum, 1984), a finding which was replicated in the present study (r = .44, p<.01).   
Summary. These personality scales offer convergent and divergent validity for the 
AIP scale of procrastination (McCown & Johnson, 1989b).  As expected, the AIP was 
positively related to scales of neuroticism and anxiety, and negatively related to 
conscientiousness, impulse control, self-regulation/self-control, and resourcefulness, and 
was not related to extraversion or curiosity.   
Daily Online Measures. 
 Participants completed 15 online questionnaires per we k starting Sunday evening 
and ending Friday afternoon.  Questionnaires were completed within 30 min of 
awakening, between 2pm and 4pm, and before going to bed.  These questionnaires 
assessed sleeping, napping, and waking habits, and inclu ed questions regarding alarm 
set time, snoozing time, sleep time, nap time, engagi  in activities before arising, and 
the number of alarms set.  Copies of these questionna res may be found in Appendix J. 
Snooze time was calculated as the number of minutes that elapsed between the 
alarm first ringing and the time at which participants reported getting out of bed.  If the 
participant reported awakening before the alarm first rang, snooze time was calculated 
from this time until the time at which the participant got out of bed.  An adjusted snooze 
time was also calculated by subtracting the time the participant reported engaging in an 
activity after the first alarm ring and before getting out of bed from snooze time.  This 
adjusted snooze time was used in several analyses.  
Table 4 displays the average amount of snooze time and adjusted snooze time per 
week for experimental and control participants.  Experimental participants snoozed an 
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average of approximately 47 min per day during Week 1, 37 min per day during Week 2, 
and 44 min per day during Week 3.  Control participants snoozed an average of 
approximately 49 min per day during Week 1, 42 min per day during Week 2, and 43 min 
per day during Week 3.  The averages for adjusted snooze times decreased approximately 
4 min on average, indicating that participants engaged in activities before getting out of 
bed an average of 4 min per week.  It should be notd that these weekly averages are 
higher than the self-reported daily average snooze tim s displayed in Table 2 of 
approximately 17 min. 
Figures 1 and 2 display the relative frequencies of sn oze times in half-hour 
segments each week for experimental and control group participants, respectively.  The 
majority of reported snooze times were less than 30 min during each of the 3 Weeks for 
both groups.  The median amount of snooze time during Week 1 was 25 min for both the 
experimental and control groups.  During Week 2, the median decreased to 10 min for the 
experimental group and 18 min for the control group.  The median snooze time during 
Week 3 was 25 min for the experimental group and 20 min for the control group.  The 
frequency of participants who snoozed between 30 min and one hour was almost half of 
the frequency of those who snoozed between 0 and 29 min, and frequencies decreased 
steadily after that over with each increase in 30-min segments.  However, there was an 
increase in the number of participants who snoozed for 3 hours or more in both the 
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Table 4 
 
Average Number of Minutes Spent Snoozing per Day during Each Week  
 
                     Experimental Group  Control Group 
          (n=78)                                   (n=32) 
 
       Snooze Time         M              SD                  M        SD 
Original       
     Week 1  47.03 33.72  49.64 40.45 
     Week 2  37.86 34.17  42.54 42.83 
     Week 3  44.11 37.98  43.84 46.35 
Adjusted       
     Week 1  41.64 33.02  46.71 41.02 
     Week 2  33.37 34.80  38.30 39.77 
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Figure 1 
 
Snooze Time (Experimental Group)
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Figure 2 
 
Snooze Time (Control Group)
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weeks, suggesting that a small subset of participants snoozed for long amounts of time on 
some mornings.   
Participants in both the experimental and control conditions slept between 6 and 8 
hours on average, although the timing of when participants went to sleep and woke up 
varied.  Figures 3 and 4 display the relative frequencies of the times at which 
experimental and control participants went to sleep ach night.  The majority of 
participants in both groups went to bed between midnight and 3am during all 3 Weeks, 
with the hour from 1am to 2am receiving the highest frequencies.  
Figures 5 and 6 contain the relative frequencies of times at which experimental 
and control participants set their alarms each morning, and Figures 7 and 8 display the 
relative frequencies of times at which participants i  each group got out of bed.  Since the 
highest frequency of snooze times fell between 0-29 min, these Figures are displayed in 
half-hour increments.  In both groups, the majority of the frequencies of the time at which 
the alarm was set during all 3 Weeks were between 8:00- :29am.  However, the highest 
frequency in the experimental group was between 7:00- 29am during Week 1.   
The time period with the highest frequencies for getting out of bed was also 8:00-
8:29am for both groups.  Interestingly, the frequenci s for getting out of bed during Week 
2 follow the alarm set time frequencies more closely than they do during Weeks 1 or 3, 
suggesting that experimental participants generally fo owed directions to get out of bed 
when the alarm first rang during Week 2.  It should also be noted that there was a spike in 
frequencies for both groups of participants who got out of bed after 12pm during Week 3, 
which supports the snooze time frequency charts showing that several participants in both 
groups “snoozed” for over 3 hours before getting out of bed.
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Figure 3 
Bed Time (Experimental Group)
Time
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Figure 4 
Bed Time (Control Group)
Time
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Figure 5 
 
Alarm Set Time (Experimental Group)
Time
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Figure 6  
Alarm Set Time (Control Group)
Time


























Out of Bed Time (Experimental Group)
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Figure 8  
Out of Bed Time (Control Group)
Time
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Because participants could access the online questionna res at any time of the day, the 
time at which they completed each questionnaire, and whether or not it was completed on 
time, was also coded.  Questionnaires that were completed outside the designated time frame 
but within 24 hours of the designated time frame were counted as late, and any questionnaire 
completed after 24 hours had elapsed was not included in the analyses.  Any questionnaire 
completed before the designated time frame was counted as early. 
Up to 4950 questionnaires could have been completed by the 110 participants over 
the 3-week period.  Table 5 shows the number and percentages of on-time, late, early, and 
missing questionnaires.   
 
 
Table 5  
 
Percentages of On-Time, Late, Early, and Missing Questionnaires  
 
     
Time Point              Late          On-Time        Early          Missing  
Morning 12.00 18.36 1.45 1.52 
 
Afternoon 14.16 13.94 1.41 3.82 
 
Evening   2.10 29.33  1.90 
 
Total 28.26 61.63 2.90 7.23 
 
Note. Percentages out of a total possible 4950 questionna res for experimental and control 
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The afternoon time point yielded the highest late and missing questionnaires and the evening 
time point yielded the highest on-time questionnaires.  It should be noted that there was no 
specific time frame for participants to complete thevening questionnaire, as the instructions 
indicated that participants should complete the questionnaire at any time before going to bed.  
There was no option to complete the evening questionnaires early; they were either on time, 
late, or missing.  These requirements were less stringent than the morning and afternoon 
questionnaire, resulting in more on-time questionnaires for this time point.  The majority of 
questionnaires was completed on time (61.63%), and the number of missing questionnaires 
was relatively low at 358 (7.23%).   
Trait fatigue and self-regulation were weakly relatd o the number of afternoon 
questionnaires completed on time, such that those higher in fatigue had fewer on-time 
afternoon questionnaires (r = -.22, p<.05) and those higher in self-regulation/self-contr l had 
more on-time afternoon questionnaires (r = .19, p<.05).  In addition, trait fatigue was related 
to the number of afternoon questionnaires completed arly and late, such that those higher in 
overall fatigue had more late afternoon questionnaires (r = .34, p<.01).  No significant 
relationships were found between trait procrastinatio , self-regulation, or overall fatigue and 
the timing of the morning or evening questionnaires.  And no significant correlations were 
found between the average number of minutes late for morning and afternoon questionnaires 
and mean procrastination, overall fatigue, or self-r gulation.   
However, results indicated mostly significant correlations between snooze time 
during all three weeks and both the number of late aft rnoon questionnaires and the average 
lateness of afternoon questionnaires in minutes.  Those who spent more average time 
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snoozing each week also completed a greater number of afternoon questionnaires late during 
Week 1 (r = .26, p<.01), Week 2 (r = .31, p<.01), and Week 3 (r = .22, p<.05).  Similarly, 
those who spent more average time snoozing each week completed the afternoon 
questionnaires relatively later Weeks 2 (r = .22, p<.05) and Week 3 (r = .28, p<.05) but not 
Week 1 (r = .17, ns).  These correlations taken together with the lack of significant 
correlations found between both trait procrastination and self-reported behavior delay suggest 
that behavioral measures of procrastination are more strongly related to delay behaviors than 
self-report measures. 
The fatigue scale developed by (Chalder et al., 1993) was used to assess state 
subjective fatigue on the morning and afternoon questionnaires.  The details of this measure 
are discussed above under trait measures.  Directions were slightly altered in order to assess 
current feelings of fatigue rather than overall feeings of fatigue.  Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation was implemented using the imputed data set (see below for elaboration) to 
obtain the average test-retest reliabilities among a d between morning and afternoon state 
fatigue assessments.  These reliabilities may be found in Table 6, along with means and 
standard deviations for these time points.  It should be noted that these test-retest reliabilities 
are relatively low, probably for two reasons.  First, state fatigue is likely to fluctuate 
throughout the day and over the course of the week, and it was not expected that daily 
assessments of state variables will be as consistent with one another, compared to 
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Table 6 
 
Means, Standard Deviation, and Average Test-Retest R liabilities for State Fatigue 
Measurement 
 
Time Point                Week             M        SD                    Reliability 
Morning 1 2.88 1.12 .49 
 2 2.88 1.35 .54 
 3 2.88 1.35 .56 
 1-3 2.85 1.24 .41 
     
Afternoon 1 2.62 1.41 .44 
 2 2.55 1.62 .20 
 3 2.52 1.12 .28 
 1-3 2.56 1.38 .24 
     
Morning-
Afternoon 
1 2.75 1.26 .49 
 2 2.71 1.48 .44 
 3 2.66 1.18 .35 
 1-3 2.71 1.31 .43 
 
Note. Descriptive statistics and test-retest reliabilities are based on imputed data set.  
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Maximization Algorithm, it was possible for the predicted values to be negative, which likely 
increased the variability and lowered the reliability3. 
Internal consistencies of this measure for each day are displayed in Table 7 for 
morning and afternoon fatigue scores in the original data set, as values were not imputed at 
the item-level and therefore internal consistencies ould not be calculated for daily imputed 
fatigue scores.  Within the original data set, the int rnal consistencies were high, with all 
values over α=.95 for both morning and afternoon subjective fatigue for all three weeks.   
Final Questionnaire 
 Experimental and control participants completed a fin l questionnaire at the end of 
the 3-week period.  Participants were asked to indicate from 0-5 the number of weekdays 
during Weeks 1, 2, and 3 each statement occurred fo a total of 10 statements.  Directions 
were altered slightly for experimental participants during Week 2 to remind them to answer 
based on their experience using the study alarm.  Questions pertained to self-regulatory 
processes engaged during the awakening process each day, whether participants followed 
directions, feelings towards snoozing and getting up in the morning, and whether snoozing 
affected close others.  One question was also included to assess whether participants 
remembered missing activities during the day due to snoozing.  Two final questions were 
included to assess the extent to which participation in the study may affect their expected 
future snooze usage and/or alarm clock choice.  These two items were answered on a yes/no 
scale.   
 
                                                
3 Test-retest reliabilities for morning and afternoo subjective fatigue scores were also calculated on the original 
data set and values ranged from r = .56-.75.  Although these internal consistencies ar  notably higher than those 
from the imputed data set, the means were not significa tly different between the original and imputed data sets. 
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Table 7  
 
Internal Consistency of Fatigue Scales from Original D ta Set 
 
           Morning Subjective Fatigue           Afternoon Subjective Fatigue 
 
          Day         M                  SD                α                  M                 SD               α 
1 3.17 1.04 .95 2.78 1.03 .95 
2 2.82 1.16 .96 2.71 1.16 .96 
3 2.86 1.11 .97 2.79 1.13 .96 
4 2.74 1.12 .96 2.62 1.14 .96 
5 2.79 1.23 .96 2.48 1.08 .96 
6 3.01 1.16 .97 2.82 1.06 .95 
7 2.86 1.17 .96 2.59 1.06 .95 
8 2.93 1.17 .96 2.71 1.16 .96 
9 2.90 1.31 .97 2.77 1.78 .96 
10 2.92 1.28 .97 2.60 1.16 .96 
11 2.90 1.11 .96 2.59 1.10 .96 
12 2.93 1.26 .97 2.64 1.34 .96 
13 2.85 1.16 .96 2.67 1.19 .96 
14 2.77 1.13 .96 2.59 1.04 .95 
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Descriptive results from this questionnaire are presented in Tables 8 through 10.  
Tables 8 and 9 display the means and standard deviations of the number of week days per 
week participants in the experimental and control gups reported engaging in various 
activities.  Participants in both groups reported difficulty getting out of bed in the morning, 
on average over 3.46 weekdays per week.  Experimental participants reported going back to 
sleep and dozing in and out of sleep more during Weeks 1 and 3 than Week 2, whereas 
control participants reported falling back asleep and dozing in and out of sleep approximately 
the same average number of days during each week.  The following three items received the 
lowest reported average frequencies each week for both experimental and control 
participants: lying in bed thinking of things that needed to be done, engaging in an activity 
before getting out of bed, and bothering close others with snooze habits.   
Future behavior intentions are displayed in Table 10. Over 50% of the experimental 
participants reported that they would change their snooze habits in the future, but only 35% 
reported that they would consider using an alarm without a snooze function in the future.  
Over 50% of the control group reported that they would not change their snooze habits in the 
future, and exactly 50% reported that they would consider using an alarm without a snooze 
button in the future.  Participants in both the experimental group and control group who 
reported willingness to use an alarm without a snooze button in the future also reported 
expecting to change snooze habits in the future (r = .46, p<.01 and r = .44, p<.05 
respectively).  A copy of this measure may be found in Appendix M.  
Analysis 
Several steps were taken prior to analysis to assess whether the data could be 
combined and assessed as originally planned, including assessment of normality, assessment  
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Table 8   
 
Average Number of Days per Week for Sleeping and Waking Activities after Pressing the 
Snooze Button (Experimental Group) 
 
           Week 1           Week 2                Week 3 
 
        Item     M                SD        M             SD        M             SD 
BTS 3.27 1.59 1.12 1.29 2.78 1.75 
 
DZD 2.92 1.73 1.36 1.32 2.47 1.77 
 
LAW   .83 1.26 1.45 1.55 1.13 1.47 
 
ENA   .63 1.28 1.03 1.49   .58 1.21 
 
RES 2.56 1.82 1.26 1.58 2.37 1.82 
 
CHP 2.05 1.74   .77 1.22 1.88 1.73 
 
LFA 1.56 1.42   .77 1.13 1.51 1.50 
 
DIF 3.77 1.42 3.46 1.50 3.72 1.37 
 
PDM 2.09 1.85 1.47 1.50 1.92 1.70 
 
BCO   .19   .76   .26   .76   .27   .91 
 
Note. N=78. BTS = back to sleep; DZD = dozed in and out of sleep; LAW = lay awake 
thinking; ENA = engage in an activity before getting out of bed; RES = regret snoozing; 
CHP = lay in bed and changed plans; LFA = late for first activity; DIF = found it difficult to 
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Table 9   
 
Average Number of Days per Week for Sleeping and Waking Activities after Pressing the 
Snooze Button (Control Group) 
 
           Week 1           Week 2                Week 3 
 
        Item      M              SD            M             SD       M            SD 
BTS 2.59 1.76 2.63 1.70 2.69 1.84 
 
DZD 2.55 1.65 2.72 1.67 2.50 1.72 
 
LAW   .72 1.22   .88 1.31 1.06 1.54 
 
ENA   .50 1.30   .59 1.29  .72 1.39 
 
RES 2.56 1.72 2.78 1.54 2.66 1.58 
 
CHP 1.69 1.64 1.94 1.39 1.66 1.34 
 
LFA 1.16 1.39 1.41 1.24 1.41 1.39 
 
DIF 3.47 1.69 3.63 1.39 3.53 1.55 
 
PDM 2.09 1.99 2.16 1.88 2.16 1.81 
 
BCO   .59 1.27   .78 1.39   .66 1.34 
 
Note. N=32. BTS = back to sleep; DZD = dozed in and out of sleep; LAW = lay awake 
thinking; ENA = engage in an activity before getting out of bed; RES = regret snoozing; 
CHP = lay in bed and changed plans; LFA = late for first activity; DIF = found it difficult to 
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Table 10  
 
Percentages of Future Behavior Intentions  
 
            Future Behavior 
 
                      FAL                        CSH                         
  
Group         Yes     No             Yes     No        
 
Experimental      34.6    65.4           53.8   46.2                              
(n = 78) 
 
Control                  50.0    50.0            46.9   53.1           
(n=32) 
Note. FAL = consider using an alarm without a snooze functio  in the future; CSH = change 
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of gender differences, comparisons of the experimental a d control groups, and completing a 
missing data analysis.  These steps are described in turn below. 
The skewness and kurtosis of all trait variables were assessed.  Skewness ranged from 
-.64 to .91 and kurtosis from -.83 to 1.52.  Similarly, for the variables measured daily and 
relevant to hypotheses, the skewness ranged from -.87 to1.9 and kurtosis from -2.04 to 4.9.  
In a normal distribution, skewness is equal to zero and kurtosis is equal to three (Kendall & 
Stuart, 1948); however the statistical program employed in analyses for the present study sets 
the kurtosis equal to zero for a normal distribution.  Nonetheless, the values obtained in this 
study are within acceptable range of what could be expected from a normal distribution, and 
the frequency plots for each variable did not indicate serious deviations from normality.  
Given the size of the present sample, skewness and kurtosis are less likely to impact variable 
distributions (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
 Potential differences between men and women on the AIP were investigated before 
combining these groups in future analyses.  An independent groups t-test indicated no 
significant mean difference between men and women (t(108) = -.12, ns, d = -.12) on this 
measure.  Additionally, because of previous findings suggesting that a stronger relationship 
may exist between the AIP and other measures of procrastination for women than for men 
(Blunt & Pychyl, 1998; Ferrari & Patel, 2004), correlations between the AIP and other trait 
measures in this study were explored.  Table 11 presents the means and standard deviations 
for each measure separated by gender and the correlations of each measure with the AIP.  
Gender differences in the strength of relationship between the AIP and other trait measures 
occurred on the following four variables: morningness-eveningness, negative affect, impulse 
control, and perfectionism.  Men who scored higher on the AIP reported less perfectionism  
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Table 11 
Correlations of the Adult Inventory of Procrastinaton (AIP) with Other Trait Measures Split 
by Gender 
 
Variables    Men (n = 47)              Women (n=63) 
               M               SD                r              M                 SD                  r
 
Procrastination 2.72   .78  2.75  .76  
       
Performance 
Approach 
4.58 1.02 -.26 4.43  .91 -.06 
Mastery Avoidance 3.93  .97 -.17 4.20  .79 -.10 
       
Mastery Approach 4.73  .81 -.15 4.50  .77 -.22 
       
Performance 
Avoidance 
4.23 1.10 -.03 4.58  .96 .07 
Overall Fatigue 3.14  .85      .51** 3.25  .99    .43** 
       
Mental Fatigue 3.31  .85      .42** 2.98 1.09   .42** 
       
Physical Fatigue 2.85 1.19      .48** 3.40 1.08  .36** 
       
Morningness-
Eveningness 
2.11  .37 -.27 2.26  .45  -.37** 
Positive Affect 5.49  .77  -.36* 5.17 1.03 -.29* 
       
Negative Affect 2.65  .99      .41** 2.95  .94 .20 
       
Sleep Disturbance 2.37  .58       -.04 2.49  .80 -.01 
       
Conscientiousness 4.18  .71    -.68** 4.34  .71  -.53** 
       
Impulse Control 4.10  .77   -.40** 4.10  .63       -.17 
       
Extraversion 3.88  .97      -.10 3.68  .96       -.09 
       
       
Neuroticism 2.56  .68    .43** 2.90  .88  .24** 
       
Resourcefulness 4.58  .72  -.38** 4.13  .68      -.36* 
       
Self-Regulation/ Self-
Control 
3.97  .73   -.65** 3.77  .68      -.69** 
Perfectionism 4.07  .74      -.30* 4.19  .87      -.20 
       
Curiosity 4.35  .63     -.13 4.32  .65       .12 
       
Anxiety 3.30  .80      .34* 3.77  .81       .29* 
 
Note. Correlations in bold indicate differences between men and women. 
** p<.01.  * p<.05 . 
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and impulse control, and greater negative affect.  Women who scored higher on the AIP 
reported greater tendency towards eveningness.  Each gender displayed the same trend in 
these correlations, but the strength of the relationship varied between men and women.   
 Several sets of independent groups t-tests were conducted to evaluate whether 
differences exist between experimental and control gr ups both within and across the three 
study sessions on trait variables, including procrastin tion, self-regulation, fatigue, and on 
variables reported on daily questionnaires, including average nap length, sleep time, and 
snooze time for each week.  First, experimental and control participants were compared 
within conditions across the three sessions.  There w  no significant trait differences in the 
either group three Sessions.  Regarding variables measured daily, experimental participants 
in Session 2 reported greater nap length during Week 1 than participants in Session 1 (t(49) = 
2.99, p<.01, d = .85) and in Session 3 (t(50) = 3.31, p<.01, d = .94).  Similarly, control 
participants in Session 2 reported greater nap length during Week 1 than participants in 
Session 1 (t 48) = -2.40, p<.05, d = .69).  Experimental participants in Session 2 repo ted 
longer time spent sleeping in Week 1 than participants in Session 3 (t(50) = -2.42, p<.05, d = 
.68).  There were no significant differences for eith r group when snooze time was compared 
across the sessions.  Taken together, these results suggest that Session 2, which occurred in 
October, may have occurred at a time in the semester during which participants slept and/or 
napped more.  Midterms frequently occur in October, which may be related to longer nap 
time and more sleep during some weeks than others.  
Second, experimental and control participants were compared within each session.  
Snooze time during Week 2 was significantly less for the experimental group than the control 
group during Session 2 (t(31) = -2.45, p < .05, d = .88), however, minimizing snooze time 
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during Week 2 was part of the instructions given to experimental participants.  No significant 
mean differences were found on any of the other variables when comparing experimental and 
control participants during Sessions 1, 2, or 3.  These findings suggest that, although 
experimental participants in Session 2 may have demonstrated significantly different nap 
length and sleep time compared to experimental participants in other sessions, these values 
were not significantly different from the control group during that Session.  These findings 
provide further support for the notion that Session 2 occurred during a busy time in the 
semester. 
Finally, control and experimental participants across all sessions were compared to 
one another.  No significant mean differences were found between groups for any of the trait 
or daily variables.  Taken together, these comparisons suggest that it is reasonable to collapse 
groups from each session into overall experimental and control groups, although the potential 
differences between Session 2 and the other two sessions will be considered when 
conducting analyses. 
 Even though efforts were made to remind and incent participants to complete each 
daily questionnaire, 7.23% of the online questionnaires were missing.  Recently, researchers 
in various fields of psychology have been urging authors not only to acknowledge missing 
data and take adequate statistical steps to handle it, but also to report in detail the strategies 
used (Jelicic, Phelps, & Lerner, 2009; Schlomer, Baum n, & Card, 2010).  Missing values 
were imputed using the Expectation-Maximization algorithm (EM algorithm; Dempster, 
Laird, & Rubin, 1977; Little & Rubin, 1989; Moon, 1996; Roth, 1994), which is an iterative 
regression technique for predicting missing values based on observed values.  Details of the 
imputation are described in the next section regarding statistical analyses.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
 This chapter is divided into several sections in order to clearly present the way in 
which the data were analyzed.  First, I describe the missing data procedures followed in order 
to impute missing values.  Next, I distinguish betwen primary and secondary analyses.  I 
then describe the primary analyses in detail, and conclude this section with a description of 
exploratory analyses which were conducted to further assess and support the primary 
analyses. 
Missing Data Analysis 
 The EM algorithm, developed by Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977) is a process 
through which missing data values are estimated.  Two steps are taken when the EM 
algorithm is applied: the expectation step followed by the maximization step.  During the 
expectation step, the expected value of the missing data point is estimated using the current 
parameter estimate from observed data.  Next, the maximization step occurs, during which 
new parameters are estimated using both the original observed data and the estimated 
expected values of missing data.  The process iterates until the parameter estimates converge 
and predicted values are provided for missing data points (Moon, 1996).   
 Important distinctions may be drawn between different patterns of missing data 
(Little & Rubin, 1989).  Missing data may be missing completely at random (MCAR), 
missing at random (MAR) or not missing at random (NMAR).  Data which are MCAR are 
missing in a truly random fashion that is unrelated to observed or missing variables in the 
data set.  MAR occurs when missing values depend on the value of an observed variable, but 
are MCAR within any level of that observed variable.  NMAR is the most difficult type of 
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missing data to contend with, as data which are NMAR are missing in a way that is directly 
related to relevant variables.  Included within the output of the missing values analysis is an 
assessment of whether the missing values are MCAR or not.  Significance at the .05-level or 
below indicates that it is plausible that data are not MCAR.  
Missing Data Imputation Procedures 
 Several considerations were made when imputing missing values for the current data 
set, including which variables to include in the EM Algorithm, how to treat values from early 
and late questionnaires, and whether the imputed data set differed significantly from the 
original data set.  Each of these considerations is described in turn below.   
Variables included in the algorithm.  Independent variables in hypotheses that were 
relevant to data with missing values were excluded to avoid replication of any direct 
relationship between observed independent and depennt variables for the missing values.  
Because variables included in the EM Algorithm are us d to predict missing values of other 
variables, any relationship between observed values would be replicated within the values 
predicted for missing values.  As a result, variables used in the algorithm will likely display a 
relationship with variables which displayed missing values, and any relationship detected in 
hypothesis testing could be due to the actual relationship between the variables or the fact 
that a perhaps trivial relationship was replicated when imputing missing values.  The 
following variables serve as independent variables in the current study and were therefore 
excluded from all missing values analyses: AIP, KSQ, PA, NA, MEQ, MSF, and MSS.  All 
other trait variables were included in missing values analyses. 
A total of fourteen different variables had missing values over the 3-week study 
period, including 7 from the morning questionnaire, 5 from the afternoon questionnaire, and 
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2 from the evening questionnaire.  Variables were divided into those that were directly 
relevant to hypotheses and those that were not.  The relevant variables included sleep time, 
snooze time, morning fatigue, and afternoon fatigue.  B cause snooze time serves as 
predictor of morning fatigue in Hypothesis 2, two separate analyses were conducted to 
impute missing values on these four variables.  Thefirst imputation included sleep time, 
morning fatigue, and afternoon fatigue; and the second imputation included sleep time and 
snooze time.  Because these analyses resulted in two different estimates of sleep time, an 
average of these two estimates was used going forward.  Finally, one missing values analysis 
was conducted using imputed snooze time, fatigue, and average sleep time to impute missing 
values on other variables such as the time at which participants went to sleep, set their 
alarms, awoke, and got out of bed, nap length, and the amount of time spent engaging in an 
activity before getting out of bed. 
 Treating values from early and late questionnaires.  Because participants were able to 
complete questionnaires outside the designated time frames, it was important to consider 
whether values from on-time questionnaires differed f om those in questionnaires completed 
early and late.  This consideration was especially important for state fatigue levels, as state 
fatigue is expected to fluctuate over the course of the day.  To explore these potential 
differences, all fatigue scores which did not come from on-time questionnaires were imputed.  
The analysis did include values from late, early, and on-time questionnaires that were 
relevant to sleeping and waking habits, but only fatigue values from the on-time 
questionnaires.   
Entries pertaining to sleeping and waking habits that came from questionnaires out of 
the designated time frame were used in this analysis rather than excluding all information 
 75  
from late and early questionnaires for two reasons.  First, it is likely that participants are 
relatively accurate in recalling times (e.g., time th y went to bed, time they woke up and got 
out of bed, time of first activity).  Any deviances in accuracy of these values are likely minor 
compared to potential deviances when imputed with a missing values analysis.  Second, 
excluding these values created a large amount of data to be imputed (over 30%), which is not 
desirable.  
 Comparing data sets with different missing values procedures.  Comparisons were 
made between several data sets to assess whether there were differences between them on 
variables with values which were imputed different ways.  The original data set with missing 
values (using information from all completed questionnaires), the data set with missing 
values imputed (using information from all completed questionnaires), and the data set with 
missing values imputed for fatigue scores from late, early, and missing questionnaires (using 
all other information from completed questionnaires) were compared.  The daily and weekly 
means and standard errors were compared on the following variables: sleep time, snooze 
time, morning subjective fatigue, afternoon subjective fatigue, time spent engaging in an 
activity before getting out of bed, and nap length.   
Figures 9 through 14 show the results of these comparisons at the mean level for 
weekly sleep time, snooze time, morning and afternoon fatigue, time spent engaging in an 
activity before getting out of bed, and nap time.  Figure 15 shows the comparisons for daily 
snooze times.  There were no significant differences (i. ., more than one standard error 
difference) between data sets on any of the weekly means except in nap length.  The means 
for all imputed data sets were significantly lower than those for the original data set for nap 
length, and the imputed values were not significantly different from one another.  One  
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possible reason for this finding may be that many repo ted nap lengths were either zero or a 
relatively larger length of time.  Fitting a regression line, which would be used to predict 
missing values, to these observed values could easily re ult in negative predicted values.  
These negative values may have brought the means down further than they were able to go in 
the original data set in which the lowest reported nap length was zero minutes.  Even though 
significant differences were not found between the imputed and original data sets, future 
analyses were conducted using the data set which imputed late and early fatigue scores in 
addition to all missing values. 
Regarding the lack of differences in state fatigue values between these data sets, 
participants were instructed to complete the fatigue scales on late questionnaires in a 
retrospective manner, recalling how they felt during the designated time frame and reporting 
those feelings rather than current feelings.  If participants were able to do this successfully, 
values imputed for missing fatigue scores and values imputed for missing, on-time, and late 
fatigue scores would not be expected to differ greatly.  Based on the similarities between 
these imputed data sets, it appears that participants were either able to respond with feelings 
of state fatigue relevant to the correct time frame ev n on questionnaires completed outside 
that time frame, or state fatigue did not fluctuate gr atly over the course of the day.  
Little’s MCAR test was not significant (p > .05) for any of the imputed data sets, 
suggesting that the data were MCAR.  Correlations were computed between all trait variables 
and the number of missing questionnaires for the morning, afternoon, and evening time 
points, as well as for total questionnaire missingness.  Table 12 shows the correlations that 
reached significance.  Related variables include gender, age, impulse control, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, and mid-sleep time point on free days.  These results suggest 
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that although the number of missed questionnaires may be related to these demographic and 
trait variables, the pattern of missing data was not contingent on participants’ scores on these 
variables.  
 
Table 12  
 
Correlates of Number of Morning, Afternoon, Evening, and Total Missing Questionnaires 
with Trait Variables  
      Questionnaires 
 
Variable            Morning               Afternoon          Evening                Total 
 
Gender -.21*  -.20* -.26*  -.26* 
Age -.20*  -.14 -.03  -.14 
Impulse Control -.20*   .06 -.04  -.04 
Conscientiousness -.24*  -.19* -.09  -.20* 
Extraversion  .21*   .22*  .22*   .25** 
MSF  .16   .17  .25**   .22* 
 
Note: Gender coded as 1 (men) and 2 (women). MSF = mid-sleep time-point on free days. 
* p<.05 . ** p<.01.   
 
 
Primary and Secondary Analyses 
 Given the number of hypotheses included in the proposed study, they were divided 
into primary and secondary hypotheses to allow for Type I error control without a large 
decrease in power.  Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 served as primary hypotheses and the remaining 
13 served as secondary hypotheses.  Because these primary hypotheses were assessed 
through two separate analyses, the alpha-value of .05 was divided by 2 and each hypothesis 
was tested at the .025-level.  Further, two paired t-t sts were conducted to assess Hypotheses 
3 and 4, and alpha was further corrected when assessing the results of each t-test. 
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 Secondary hypotheses which pertained to relationshps between traits are presented 
and discussed in Appendix N.  Support was found for six of the eight hypotheses regarding 
trait relationships.  In addition, exploratory hypotheses regarding afternoon subjective fatigue 
and goal orientation may be found in Appendix O.  These analyses were conducted as 
proposed but did not yield findings relevant to the primary hypotheses.   
Primary Analyses 
Primary hypotheses and several secondary hypotheses which are relevant to snooze 
time and/or subjective morning fatigue will be presented below.  This separation is 
implemented in order to focus on the primary hypotheses and other findings relevant to 
procrastination, fatigue, and self-regulation.  Zero-o der correlations were computed between 
all trait measures and can be found in Table 13.  Hypotheses were tested using correlational 
analyses, paired t-tests, and hierarchical regression analyses, and are escribed in detail 
below in order of hypothesis.   
 Several hierarchical regression analyses were conducte  to assess variables that might 
predict snooze time and subjective morning fatigue aft r controlling for the number of hours 
slept.  Hypothesis 1 stated that trait procrastinatio  would be positively associated with 
snooze time during Weeks 1 and 3.  Experimental and co trol groups were examined 
together, and morning fatigue scores from Week 1 were averaged for each participant to 
represent a baseline morning fatigue score.  For the first analysis, the average amount of 
sleep time (in minutes) during Week 1 was entered in the first step, and mean trait 
procrastination was entered next.  Average minutes slept accounted for a significant amount 
of variance in snooze time (R2 = .33, p < .01) and trait procrastination accounted for a sm ll 
but significant amount of variance beyond the amount f time slept (∆R2 = .03, p<.05).   
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Table 13 Summary of Intercorrelations between All Trait Measures 
    
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
1. AIP                       
2. GPAP -.15                      
3. GMA -.13 .10                     
4. GMAP -.19 .19  .44**                    
5. GPA .02 .13  .23* .02                   
6. CFS  .46** -.06 .19 -.04 .08                  
7. CFSP  .41** .05 .18 -.01 .10  .93**                 
8. CFSM  .41** -.20* .15 -.07 .03  .84**  .59**                
9. MEQ -.32** -.09 .19 .17 .07 -.24* -.26** -.15               
10. PA -.31** .07 -.05  .22* -.03 -.36** -.40** -.21*  .22*              
11. NA  .29** .05  .27** .01  .26**  .52**  .48**  .43** -.02 -.28**             
12. KSQ -.02 -.08 .07 .07 .12 .17  .19* .09 .13 -.11 .07            
13. CON -.59**  .22*  .27**  .19* .01 -.41** -.36** -.38**  .29**  .38** -.19 -.12           
14. IMP -.28** -.04 -.06 -.01 -.13 -.29** -.24*  .29** .04 .02 -.41** -.13   .17          
15. EXT -.09 -.12 -.16 -.20* -.02 -.18 -.24* -.03 -.10  .41** -.21* -.03   .07 -.31**         
16. NEURO  .36** .03  .22* -.07 .16  .52**  .47**  .46** .00 -.52**  .69** .09 -.18 -.41** -.28**        
17. RSC -.36** -.03 -.15 .17 -.12 -.40** -.39** -.32** .05  .62** -.44** -.10  .32** .18 .47** -.63**       
18. SRSC -.66** .15 .11  .22* .03 -.36** -.36** -.27**  .29**  .41** -.23* -.10  .52** .32** -.02 -.28**  .41**      
19. PERF -.24* .36**  .41**  .26**  .20* .09 .12 .03 .18 .15  .22* .07  .58** -.15 -.08  .29** -.02  .21*     
20. CUR .01 -.09 -.13 .05 -.11 -.30** -.35** -.15 .07  .55** -.37** .05  .20* .02  .40** -.38**  .40** .01 .03    
21. ANX  .44** .11 .10 -.13 .07  .55**  .58**  .35** -.29** -.52**  .51** .07 -.27** -.42** -.24*  .65** -.64** -.53** .08 -.36**   
22. MSS  .19* -.03 .00 .05 -.02 .16 .18 .10 -.41**  .21* .08 -.22* -.23* -.11 .06 .05 .04 -.18 -.10 -.21* .19*  
23. MSF  .30** -.03 -.10 .00 -.04 .12 .12 .08 -.50** -.02 .00 -.07 -.23* .05 .02 -.06 .08 -.16 -.20 -.02 .10 .43** 
 
Note. AIP = Adult Inventory of Procrastination; GPAP = Achievement Goal Orientation Performance Approach; GMA= Achievement Goal Orientation Mastery Avoidance; GMAP= 
Achievement Goal Orientation Mastery Approach; GPA = chievement Goal Orientation Performance Avoid; CFS = Chalder Fatigue Scale; CFSP = Chalder Physical Fatigue Subscale; CFSM 
= Chalder Mental Fatigue Subscale; MEQ = Morningness Eveningness Questionnaire; PA = Positive Affect; NA = Negative Affect; KSQ = Karolinska Sleep Disturbance Questionnaire; CON = 
Conscientiousness; IMP = Impulse Control; EXT = Extraversion; NEURO = Neuroticism; RSC = Resourcefulness; SRSC = Self-Regulation/Self-Control; PERF = Perfectionism; CUR = 
Curiosity; ANX = Anxiety; MSS = Mid-Sleep Time-point on School Days; MSF = Mid-Sleep Time-Point on Free Days. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. 
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Similar steps were followed in the second analysis for Week 3.  Average minutes 
slept accounted for a significant amount of variance in snooze time (R2 = .34, p < .01) 
and trait procrastination added significant incremental prediction (R2 = .02, p<.05).  It 
should be noted that average sleep time was negativly related to snooze time, such that 
the greater the average sleep time, the less average morning snooze time, whereas 
procrastination was positively related, with higher trait procrastination associated with 
longer snooze time.  Table 14 displays the beta-weights and changes in R2 associated 
with these hierarchical regression analyses.  These findings provide support for 
Hypothesis 1, in that trait procrastination was a significant predictor of morning snooze 
time during Weeks 1 and 3, after accounting for the number of hours slept.  It should be 
noted that the relationship between trait procrastin tion and self-reported average snooze 
time was not significant (r = .11, ns), indicating that a different relationship between trait 
procrastination and behavior delay emerges when using self-reports of behavior versus 
aggregated measures of behavior. 
To test the second hypothesis, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to 
assess whether snooze time would contribute unique prediction to morning fatigue scores 
above and beyond the amount of time slept.  As this hypothesis was a primary 
hypothesis, it was tested with an alpha-level of .025   Support was not provided for 
Hypothesis 2, as snooze time was not a significant predictor of morning fatigue, after 
accounting for the number of hours slept during any week of the study.  These findings 
were similar when examining experimental and control g ups separately and all 
participants combined.  Table 15 displays the beta-weights and changes in R2 associated  
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Table 14  
 
Trait Procrastination as Predictor of Snooze Time  
 












    
Note. N = 110.  
* p<.05. **p<.01 
 
 
Table 15  
 
Snooze Time as Predictor of Subjective Morning Fatigue  
 
Week            Predictor                      ∆R2             df                β                  
1 Step 1  
  Minutes Slept  
.04 1, 108 -.18 
 Step 2 
Snooze Time  
 .00 2, 107 .03 
 Total R2 .04   
     
2 Step 1  
  Minutes Slept  
      .07* 1, 108 -.27* 
 Step 2 
Snooze Time  
       .00 2, 107 -.04 
 Total R2        .07*   
     
3 Step 1  
  Minutes Slept  
      .11** 1, 108 -.39** 
 Step 2 
Snooze Time  
       .01 2, 107 -.11 
 Total R2       .12**   
 
Note. N = 110. 
* p<.05. **p<.01 
1 Step 1 
 Minutes Slept 
.33** 1, 108  -.58** 
 Step 2 
 Procrastination 
    .03* 2, 107 .18* 
 Total R2 .36**   
3 Step 1 
 Minutes Slept  
.34** 1, 108  -.58** 
 Step 2 
 Procrastination 
    .02* 2, 107 .16* 
 Total R2 .36**   
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with these hierarchical regression analyses for all participants.  Average sleep time was a 
significant predictor of morning overall fatigue in Weeks 2 and 3, such that the more time 
slept, the less morning fatigue reported; however, snooze time did not add unique 
prediction to morning fatigue beyond time slept.  To explore this hypothesis another way, 
partial correlations were conducted for each day betwe n snooze time and subjective 
morning fatigue once the amount of time slept was accounted for.  These correlations 
were transformed using Fisher’s -to-z transformation, then averaged within each week 
and transformed back into correlations.  However, the correlations between morning 
fatigue and snooze time were all close to zero, suggesting no relationship between snooze 
time and morning fatigue. 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, paired t-tests were conducted to assess whether 
morning fatigue scores were different across each week of the study.  Differences were 
expected among the experimental group, such that men orning fatigue would be lower 
during Week 2 than Weeks 1 and 3.  As these were two of the three primary hypotheses 
in the current study, an alpha-value of .025 was divided by 2 to yield and alpha of .0125 
with which these hypotheses would be tested.  Mean morning fatigue scores were 
aggregated during each week and compared.  Significa t differences were not detected 
between mean morning subjective fatigue scores for either comparison.  As a result, 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported.   
As mentioned previously, snooze time was only significantly lower for the 
experimental group during Session 2 than for experim ntal groups in other Sessions.  To 
explore whether experimental groups would display different mean fatigue scores within 
their respective Sessions, they were split by session and fatigue scores were assessed 
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between Weeks within each Session; however, no mean differences were found between 
Week 2 and Weeks 1 and 3 within any of the 3 Session .  These hypotheses were 
explored further in exploratory analyses, and a description of related findings may be 
found below under the Exploratory Analyses section. 
Hypothesis 8 stated that baseline morning fatigue scores would be related to the 
global scale of sleep disturbance.  Hypothesis 8 was supported, in that baseline morning 
fatigue scores were positively related to the KSQ scale of sleep disturbance (r = .21, 
p<.05), indicating that greater morning fatigue during Week 1 was significantly related to 
reports of sleep disturbance.  Subjective morning fati ue during Week 1 was also 
negatively correlated with the MEQ (r = -.30, p<.01), providing support for Hypothesis 
10, which stated that baseline subjective morning fati ue would be related to higher 
ratings of trait eveningness.  As hypothesized, participants who reported higher levels of 
subjective morning fatigue during Week 1 also scored lower on the MEQ, indicating 
greater preference towards eveningness than morningness.   
Hypotheses 14 and 16 were explored through several regression analyses 
assessing whether trait positive and negative affect would be significant predictors of 
morning fatigue scores.  Experimental and control gups were combined for these 
analysis.  Support was provided for both hypotheses, in that PA and NA were significant 
predictors of morning fatigue scores during all 3 Weeks after controlling for amount of 
time slept.  Table 16 displays beta-weights and changes in R2 associated with these 
analyses.  An opposite pattern was found for the prediction from PA than the prediction 
from NA, such that greater levels of reported PA predicted lower levels of morning 
fatigue, whereas greater levels of reported NA predict  higher levels of morning fatigue.   
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Table 16  
 
Positive and Negative Affect as Predictors of Subjectiv  Morning Fatigue  
 
Week            Predictor                       ∆R2               df                β                  
1 Step 1 
 Minutes Slept  
.04* 1, 108 -.19* 
 Step 2 
  Positive Affect 
.14** 2, 107 -.37** 
 Total R2 .18**   
     
1 Step 1  
  Minutes Slept  
   .04 1, 108 -.11 
 Step 2 
  Negative Affect 
.13** 2, 107  .38** 
 Total R2 .17**   
     
2 Step 1 
 Minutes Slept  
   .07* 1, 108 -.23* 
 Step 2 
  Positive Affect 
.16** 2, 107 -.40** 
 Total R2 .23**   
     
2 Step 1  
  Minutes Slept  
   .07* 1, 108 -.19* 
 Step 2 
  Negative Affect 
.14** 2, 107  .38** 
 Total R2 .21**   
     
3 Step 1 
 Minutes Slept  
.11** 1, 108 -.31** 
 Step 2 
  Positive Affect 
   .03* 2, 107 -.19* 
 Total R2 .14**   
     
3 Step 1  
  Minutes Slept  
   .11* 1, 108 -.29* 
 Step 2 
  Negative Affect 
   .05* 2, 107  .22* 
 Total R2    .16*   
 
Note. N = 110 
* p<.05. **p<.01 
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Exploratory Analyses 
Further Exploration of Primary Hypotheses 
Given that fatigue scores were expected to be lower during Week 2 based on the 
restriction of snooze time during that week, snooze tim  was further explored to assess 
whether or not participants followed instructions.  For experimental participants across all 
sessions, snooze time was significantly lower during Week 2 than Week 1 (t(77) = 2.67, p 
<.01, d = .60), but not Week 3 (t(77) = -1.77, ns, d = .40).  These differences were not 
present for the control group.  However, it may be that one Session is driving the overall 
difference in snooze times across weeks.  To explore this possibility, experimental 
participants were then compared within each Session.  Table 17 shows that significant 
differences in snooze time between weeks exist within both Sessions 1 and 2, suggesting 




Contrast of Snooze Times between Weeks 1 and 2, 2 and 3, for Experimental Group by 
Session 
 
         Week 1                 Week 2            Week 3 
Session     M          SD   M           SD         M            SD           t    df    d
1a 50.73 34.70 39.83 39.14   2.05* 25 .66 
   39.83 38.14 55.01 46.96 -2.99* 25 .80 
2b 47.67 31.14 33.28 28.99   2.48* 24 1.07 
   33.28 28.99 38.72 30.63 -1.13 24 .41 
3c 42.87 35.82 40.20 34.37   .41 26 .17 
   40.20 34.37 38.61 33.28 .21 26 .11 
 
Note. a N=26; b N=25; c N=27 
* p< .05 (1-tailed) 
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However, there were no significant differences within Session 3.  The lack of significant 
difference in snooze times for this Session could be attributable to one of several 
explanations.  It may be that, on average, these partici nts may not have fully followed 
study instructions to minimize snooze time during Week 2.  Alternatively, the average 
daily snooze time during Week 1 for this Session is somewhat lower than that of Sessions 
1 or 2 during Week 1, suggesting that participants in his Session snoozed less to begin 
with.  As a result, the lack of significant difference in snooze times during Week 2 
compared to Week 1 could be because snooze time start d at a lower point to begin with.   
Inspection of the combined experimental group from Sessions 1 and 2 further 
indicated that snooze time was lower during Week 2 than Week 1 (t 50) = 3.24, p<.01, d 
= .84) and Week 3 (t(50)=-2.95, p<.01, d = .62).  However, subjective morning fatigue 
did not follow the same trend, and was relatively similar across the 3-week period for the 
experimental group in these two Sessions.  Further analyses included only individuals 
whose snooze time decreased from Week 1 to Week 2, which included 51 of the 78 
experimental participants in all 3 Sessions; however, subjective morning fatigue was not 
lower during Week 2 for these participants. 
Taking a different perspective, participants whose fatigue did decrease during 
Week 2 of the study, as compared to Week 1, were examined more closely.  These 
individuals were identified by visually comparing mean subjective morning fatigue from 
Week 2 to Week 1.  Anyone whose fatigue stayed the same or was higher during Week 2 
was not included in this analysis.  Paired t-tests indicate that these participants did snooze 
for less time during Week 2 than Week 1 (t(49) = 2.80, p<.01, d = .60) and Week 3 (t(49) 
= -2.66, p<.05, d = .56).  However, comparisons of their mean fatigue scores indicated no 
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significant differences during Week 2 compared to Week 1 or Week 3, and snooze time 
did not emerge as a significant predictor of subjectiv  morning fatigue for these 
participants, after controlling for amount of time sl pt.  These participants did not report 
different sleep times, nap lengths, or time spent engaging in an activity before getting out 
of bed during Week 2 compared to Weeks 1 or 3.  Although subjective morning fatigue 
decreased from Week 1 to Week 2 for these participants, nd snooze time decreased as 
well, the change in fatigue was not significant.  This finding suggests that there may be 
individual differences in the level of subjective morning fatigue scores which increase the 
variability of responses such that, when averaged across, the weekly differences in 
fatigue tend to dissipate.   
Further analyses included adjusted snooze time, which accounted for the time 
spent engaging in an activity after the first alarm ring and before getting out of bed.   
Adjusted snooze time was then averaged over each week.  Based on these results, 
adjusted snooze time was also lower during Week 2 than Week 1 (t 77) = 2.27, p<.05, d 
= .55) but not Week 3 (t(77) = -1.4, ns, d = .33) for all experimental participants.  This 
finding suggests that after accounting for the amount f time participants spent engaging 
in activities before getting out of bed, snooze time was still significantly less during 
Week 2 than Week 1.  Yet, fatigue scores did not change. 
Further Exploration of Primary Hypotheses through Reported Self-Regulatory Processes 
As the primary hypotheses predicted that subjective morning fatigue would 
decrease when snooze time decreased due to the decreas d engagement in self-regulatory 
processes, these processes were explored.  Although self-regulation was not directly 
assessed each day, at the end of the 3-week period, participants retrospectively reported 
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the number of days they engaged in self-regulatory processes when getting out of bed 
each week.  Three questions on the Final Questionnaire assessed self-regulation, 
including the number of days participants lay awake ft r pressing the snooze button 
thinking of things they needed to do, changed plans for the morning after pressing the 
snooze button, and planned to do more things before their first scheduled activities than 
they actually accomplished.   
Paired t-tests indicate that experimental participants repot d laying awake 
thinking of things they needed to do on more days during Week 2 than Week 1 (t(77) = -
3.53, p<.05, d = .99) and Week 3 (t(77) = 1.75, p<.05, one-tailed, d = .47).  They reported 
changing their morning plans on fewer days during Week 2 than Week 1 (t(77) = 6.47, 
p<.01, d = 1.93) and Week 3 (t(77) = -6.21, p<.01, d = 1.68).  Finally, participants 
reported planning to do more before their first scheduled activities on fewer days during 
Week 2 than Week 1 (t(77) = 2.9, p<.01, d = .83) and Week 3 (t(77) = -2.25, p<.05, d = 
.63).  These differences were not present in the reports of the control group.  These 
findings suggest that, for the experimental group, two of the assessed self-regulatory 
processes were not utilized as often during Week 2 as they were during Weeks 1 and 3, 
and one self-regulatory process was utilized more often in Week 2 than the other 2 
weeks. 
Additionally, experimental participants reported falling back asleep after the first 
alarm ring on fewer days during Week 2 than Week 1 (t(77) = 10.16, p<.01, d = 3.34) and 
Week 3 (t(77) = 7.30, p<.01, d = 2.44).  Similarly, these participants reported dozing in 
and out of sleep on fewer days during Week 2 than Week 1 (t(77) = 6.52, p<.01, d = 
2.29) but on and Week 3 (t(77) = 4.69, p<.01, d = 1.61).  These differences were also not 
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present in the control group.  These results are consistent with the lower snooze times 
reported above during Week 2 for experimental but not control participants. 
Because the final questionnaire was retrospective, i  may be considered as a 
reflection of a manipulation check rather than of accurate reports of processes and 
activities engaged in each week.  To assess whether participants’ reports on the Final 
Questionnaire were consistent with to data collected from the Daily Questionnaires, two 
correlations were conducted.  The first correlation assessed the relationship between the 
number of days participants reported engaging in activities before getting out of bed on 
the Final Questionnaire and their daily reports.  Significant correlations were found 
between retrospective reports and daily reports during Weeks 1 (r = -.39, p<.01) and 2 (r 
= .35, p<.01), but not Week 3 (r = .04, ns).  However, the negative correlation suggests 
an inverse relationship between what participants retrospectively reported and what they 
reported each day.  This relationship runs contrary to the positive correlation found 
during Week 2.  The second correlation assessed the relationship between the number of 
days participants reported being late to or missing their first scheduled activities of the 
day on the Final Questionnaire and their daily repots.  Results indicate nonsignificant 
relationships for all 3 Weeks.  These findings suggest that participants’ memories 
pertaining to the questions asked on the Final Questionnaire were not accurate the 
majority of the time, or were not in the expected direction, when compared to data 
collected each day.  
These supplemental analyses provide evidence to sugge t that experimental 
participants seemed to follow directions to use the study alarm and snooze less during 
Week 2; however, they did not report lower feelings of ubjective morning fatigue during 
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Week 2 compared to Weeks 1 and 3.  These participants did not report different nap 
times or sleep times across the three weeks of the study, suggesting that subjective 
morning fatigue was not influenced by these other variables.  Participants also reported 
engaging in several self-regulation processes on fewer days during Week 2; however, 
these retrospective reports must be interpreted with caution, as the assessment of 
participants’ recall suggests an incompatibility between the self-reported behaviors and 
actual behaviors. 
Further Exploration of the Relationship between Trait Procrastination and State Fatigue 
Given that previous studies have found a relationship between procrastination and 
fatigue at the trait level (Gropel & Steel, 2008), but results reported above do not support 
a relationship between behavioral procrastination and state fatigue, steps were taken to 
explore whether perhaps trait procrastination was related to state fatigue.  Both 
experimental and control groups were included in these analyses.  Interestingly, an 
exploratory hierarchical regression analysis revealed that trait procrastination added 
unique prediction to morning and afternoon subjectiv  fatigue during Weeks 1 and 2 after 
controlling for the length of time slept and snoozed.  Tables 18 and 19 display beta-
weights and changes in R2 for these analyses.  Trait procrastination accounted for an 
additional 11% of the variance in subjective morning fatigue during Week 1 and 5% 
during Week 2.  Similarly, trait procrastination accounted for an additional 3% of the 
variance in subjective afternoon fatigue during Week 1 and 6% during Week 2. 
Further hierarchical multiple regression analyses wre conducted to assess the 
variance accounted for in both morning and afternoon subjective fatigue by 
procrastination above what might be predicted by other related trait variables, including  
 98  
Table 18  
 
Trait Procrastination as the Predictor of Subjective Morning Fatigue 
 
      Week       Predictor                   ∆R2                 df                β                  
1 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.04* 1, 108 -.19* 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time 
.00 2, 107  .03 
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.11** 3, 106 .35** 
 Total R2 .15**   
     
2 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.07** 1, 108 -.26** 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.00 2, 107 -.04 
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.05* 3, 106 .24* 
 Total R2 .12*   
     
3 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.11** 1, 108 -.33** 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time 
.01 2, 107 -.11 
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.03 3, 106 .18 
 Total R2 .13*   
 
Note. N=110. 
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Table 19  
 
Trait Procrastination as the Predictor of Subjective Afternoon Fatigue 
 
      Week       Predictor                   ∆R2                df                β                  
1 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.14** 1, 108 -.37** 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.01 2, 107  .11 
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.03* 3, 106 .19* 
 Total R2 .18*   
     
2 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.11** 1, 108 -.33** 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.03 2, 107  .18 
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.06 3, 106 .26** 
 Total R2 .20**   
     
3 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.15** 1, 108 -.39** 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.04* 2, 107 -.24* 
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.02 3, 106 .16 
 Total R2 .21*   
 
Note. N=110. 
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Table 20 
 
Trait Procrastination as the Predictor of Subjective Morning Fatigue after Controlling for 
Related Trait Variables 
 
      Week       Predictor                      ∆R2                df              β                  
1 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.04* 1, 108 -.19* 
 Step 2 
  Trait variablesa  
.24** 3, 106   
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.03* 4, 105 .20* 
 Total R2 .31**   
     
2 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.07** 1, 108 -.20* 
 Step 2 
  Trait variablesa 
.22** 3, 106   
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.00 4, 105 .06 
 Total R2 .29**   
     
3 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.10** 1, 108 -.33** 
 Step 2 
  Trait variablesa 
.13** 3, 106   
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.00 4, 105 .03 
 Total R2 .24**   
 
Note. N=110. aTrait variables include anxiety and neuroticism. 
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Table 21 
 
Trait Procrastination as the Predictor of Subjective Afternoon Fatigue after Controlling 
for Related Trait Variables 
 
      Week       Predictor                      ∆R2                df              β                  
1 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.14** 1, 108 -.37** 
 Step 2 
  Trait variablesa  
.12** 3, 106   
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.01 4, 105 .09 
 Total R2 .26*   
     
2 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.11** 1, 108 -.33* 
 Step 2 
  Trait variablesa  
.21** 3, 106  
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.00 4, 105 .07 
 Total R2 .32**   
     
3 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.15** 1, 108 -.39** 
 Step 2 
  Trait variablesa  
.15** 3, 106   
 Step 3 
  Procrastination 
.00 4, 105 -.01 
 Total R2 .30**   
 
Note. N=110. aTrait variables include anxiety and neuroticism. 
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anxiety and neuroticism.  Sleep time was entered in Step 1, the two trait variables were 
entered in 2, and trait procrastination was entered in Step 3.  Tables 20 and 21 display 
beta-weights and changes in R2 for the analyses conducted regarding morning fatigue and 
afternoon fatigue, respectively.  In all analyses, neuroticism and anxiety predicted a 
significant amount of variance in subjective fatigue above and beyond that predicted by 
the amount of time slept.  However, trait procrastination only accounted for a significant 
amount of incremental variance beyond that in morning subjective fatigue during Week 1 
(3%).  Taken together, these results suggest that the relationship between trait 
procrastination and state fatigue is driven by the relationship between trait procrastination 
and other trait variables, and that the relationship between trait procrastination and 
fatigue is weak at the state-level. 
Summary 
 To summarize, trait procrastination was a significant predictor of behavioral 
procrastination as indicated by snooze time, and this relationship was stronger than the 
relationship between trait procrastination and self-reported snooze time.  Trait 
procrastination was also a significant predictor of state subjective fatigue, both in the 
mornings and afternoons.  However, behavioral procrastination did not predict state 
fatigue as expected and there were no significant differences in state fatigue across the 
three weeks of the study.  The smallest statistically significant result in the current study 
had an associated effect size of d = .43.  A post-hoc power analysis indicates that te 
power associated with this effect size was .93.  Recall that the a priori hypothesized 
effect size for differences in fatigue scores across the week had an absolute value of d = 
.40, which has an associated power level of .88.  This power level is relatively strong, 
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suggesting that an existing difference in fatigue scores with an associated effect size of d 
= .40 or greater would have been detected.  Retrospective self-reports of self-regulation 
activities suggest a decrease in several self-regulatory activities during Week 2, but an 
increase in one self-regulatory activity during this Week.  But these findings must be 
interpreted with caution because retrospective reports of other activities did not align with 
reports obtained from daily measures.  As expected, positive and negative trait affect 
significantly predicted subjective morning fatigue during all three weeks.  Finally, trait 
procrastination did not account for a significant amount of variance in subjective fatigue 
after controlling for neuroticism and anxiety. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
This study was conducted to explore the relationships between procrastination, 
self-regulation, and fatigue using a longitudinal, within-subjects design and a control 
group to assess the amount of time participants spend utting off getting out of bed in the 
morning and related outcomes.  Recent research on procrastination has suggested that 
procrastination represents a self-regulatory failure (Steel, 2007) or a lack of 
metacognitive strategies (Wolters, 2003).  However, research has yet to explore the ways 
in which self-regulation may fail during procrastination.  One possibility is that self-
regulatory processes are absent when procrastination occurs; another is that these 
processes are in-use but are misguided.  Because previous research has found that the use 
of self-regulation results in higher levels of fatigue (Muraven et al., 1998), and that 
procrastination is positively related to fatigue (Gropel & Steel, 2008), I proposed that 
self-regulation is the mechanism underlying the relationship between procrastination and 
fatigue.   
Several noteworthy findings arise from the present tudy.  First, as expected, trait 
procrastination accounted for a significant amount of variance in the amount of time 
spent delaying getting out of bed, suggesting that those who report higher levels of trait 
procrastination also demonstrate longer periods of behavior delay.  However, this 
relationship was not present when global, self-repoted behavior delay was assessed, but 
was only detected using daily measures of self-report d behavior through ESM.  Second, 
I expected that if procrastination involves the misuse of self-regulatory processes, greater 
levels of fatigue would be reported following periods of longer behavior delay as 
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opposed to shorter periods.  Although participants in he experimental group decreased 
the amount of time spent procrastinating getting out of bed during Week 2, subjective 
morning fatigue did not decrease.  Retrospective reports of self-regulatory activities 
provided inconclusive results regarding the mental processes in which participants 
engaged while procrastinating due to: a) the decrease of some self-regulatory processes 
and increase in others during Week 2, and b) the lack of correspondence between the 
retrospective reports of other activities (e.g., being late to or missing scheduled activities) 
and daily reports of the same activities.  Finally, trait variables such as positive affect, 
negative affect, and trait procrastination predicted a significant amount of variance in 
subjective morning fatigue; however, that variance a counted for by trait procrastination 
decreased substantially when other trait variables, which have been shown to predict 
subjective fatigue, were included.  Methodological, theoretical, and practical implications 
are discussed below, as well as future directions and limitations. 
Methodological Implications 
Experience sampling methodology was utilized to asses  behavioral 
procrastination multiple times over a three-week period.  This methodology was 
implemented to allow for aggregation, similar to the way in which self-report measures 
consist of multiple items which assess a given construct.  Multiple measures of a self-
reported behavior were obtained and averaged to assess general behavioral tendencies.  
The present study demonstrated a significant relationship between trait procrastination 
and daily self-reported behavioral procrastination hat was not found between trait 
procrastination and global self-reported behavioral p ocrastination.  These findings 
suggest that aggregation of multiple self-reported b haviors over a period of time 
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provides a different indication of behavioral procrastination than global self-reports 
regarding behavior.  Moreover, the stronger relationship between repeatedly-measured 
behavioral procrastination and self-reported trait procrastination aligns with theoretical 
expectations that someone who reports greater global procrastination tendencies would 
also demonstrate greater behavior delay.  In contrast, the nonsignificant relationship 
between trait procrastination and self-reports of behavior does not follow these 
theoretical expectations.  As a result, these findings indicate that repeated measures of a 
self-reported behavior provide a different and likely more accurate measure of that 
behavior than individuals are able to report through global self-report measures.   
To date, only one study has employed ESM in the assssment of the affective 
correlates of procrastination (Pychyl, Lee et al., 2000).  However, ESM was used to 
obtain information regarding the activities in whic participants were engaging in during 
several days before an academic deadline, and partici nts only reported procrastinating 
during a small portion of the assessed time-points.  In light of the findings from the 
present study, it is recommended that future research rs interested in behavior delay 
should utilize ESM in order to obtain more accurate measures of procrastination 
behavior.  
Theoretical Implications 
The primary hypotheses in the current study was that, due to the misuse of self-
regulatory resources during procrastination, and the fact that self-regulatory processes 
lead to fatigue (Muraven et al., 1998), longer periods of behavior delay would lead to 
greater fatigue.  However, reports of subjective fatigue did not fluctuate in accordance 
with the length of time spent procrastinating getting out of bed.  These findings have 
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theoretical implications regarding the relationship of procrastination with self-regulation 
and the relationship of procrastination with fatigue, each of which is discussed in turn 
below. 
Relationship between procrastination and self-regulation.  Given that both 
behavioral procrastination and self-reported engagement in several self-regulatory 
processes decreased during Week 2, it may be that procrastination and self-regulation are 
related, such that when procrastination decreases, so does the use of self-regulatory 
processes, and vice versa.  These findings would suggest that misguided self-regulation is 
involved in behavioral procrastination.  However, the lack of change in fatigue scores 
would suggest that, in this particular case, the misuse of self-regulatory strategies case 
does not lead to fatigue. 
One possible reason why changes in fatigue were not detected could be that the 
self-regulatory processes engaged during procrastination are more automatized than in 
other settings, requiring fewer cognitive resources such that feelings of fatigue would not 
be affected.  Although much of the research on self-regulation suggests that it is a 
controlled, resource-depleting process (e.g., R. Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989; Muraven & 
Baumeister, 2000; Muraven et al., 1998), DeShon, Brown, and Greenis (1996) reported 
that self-regulation may not necessarily be a controlled process all the time.  The authors 
conducted a study using simple tasks to assess whether self-regulation pertaining to the 
primary task (tracking) requires attentional resources which interfere with the secondary 
task (letter memorization).  While self-regulation was engaged through goal-setting on 
the primary task, it did not interfere with performance on the secondary task.  These 
findings indicate that self-regulation may not always deplete cognitive resources and lead 
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to fatigue.  When applied to the current study, it may be that the changes in plans and 
goals that occur when delaying getting out of bed ar  akin to “simple” tasks which do not 
require controlled cognition.   
That participants were able to retrospectively repot engaging in various self-
regulatory processes seems to indicate that they were aware of these thoughts and 
processes, suggesting that they were conscious and controlled.  However, further 
assessment of the accuracy of participant recall in reporting these self-regulation 
activities called into question whether participants were able to accurately remember and 
report the behaviors in which they engaged each morning.  Reports regarding mental 
processes over the three-week period may have been more reflective of participants’ 
intent to show understanding of study instructions rather than accurate recall of plan and 
goal changing each morning.  Retrospective self-reports of self-regulatory processes, 
then, may be inaccurate, which is, as Mischel (1977) suggested, one of the troubles with 
self-report measures.   
If participants were not able to accurately report the engagement in self-regulatory 
processes each morning, the explanation that procrastination represents a lack of self-
regulatory processes should be explored.  This explanation suggests that differences in 
fatigue were not detected because procrastination represents an absence of self-regulatory 
processes rather than the presence of misguided self-regu atory processes.  If self-
regulatory processes are not engaged during procrastination, differences in fatigue that 
result from engagement in self-regulation would not be expected directly following 
behavioral procrastination.  From this explanation, t follows that the negative correlation 
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between procrastination and self-regulation at the trait level reflects a lack of self-
regulatory strategies for those high in trait procrastination.   
As I cannot offer conclusive evidence for the nature of the relationship between 
procrastination and self-regulation, three directions for future research are offered.  First, 
future researchers should directly assess self-regulatory processes that may or may not 
occur during behavioral procrastination, perhaps through think-aloud protocols or more 
extensive questioning through ESM.  Second, future inv stigators should explore the 
inconclusive results offered by Muraven et al. (1999) regarding self-regulation as a 
muscle that might increase resistance to fatigue over time.  If that is the case, individuals 
who procrastinate on a regular basis might employ self-regulatory processes frequently, 
but not feel fatigued from them as often as someone who does not procrastinate.  Finally, 
research by Tomarken and Kirschenbaum (1982) suggests that differential self-
monitoring may occur, in which individuals monitor positively valued behaviors less 
frequently than negatively valued behaviors.  It may be that behavior delay in the present 
study was positively valued at the time of its occurrence (perhaps due to engaging in 
another, more pleasant activity, such as sleeping-in), and, as a result, individuals were 
less likely to engage in self-regulation.  Future researchers might explore whether the 
value placed in the behavior which is being delayed plays a role in engagement of self-
regulatory activities. 
Relationship between procrastination and fatigue.  Previous research has 
suggested a relationship between procrastination and fatigue at the trait level (e.g., Gropel 
& Steel, 2008), a finding that was replicated in the current study.  This study also 
explored the relationship between procrastination and f tigue at the state level, but no 
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significant findings were revealed.  Similarly, previous research by Pychyl et al. (2000) 
which assessed several instances of behavior delay, also did not find a significant 
relationship between state procrastination and state positive or negative affect.  This lack 
of relationship was proposed to be due to the instability of very few behavioral measures.  
However, the current study measured a behavioral indicator of procrastination repeatedly 
over a three-week period, and this measure was also not significantly related to state 
subjective fatigue.  Taken together, these findings suggest that despite the fact that 
individuals who are high in trait procrastination report wishing to reduce the tendency to 
delay (Solomon & Rothblum, 1984), and that these indiv duals do delay behavior more 
than others who are low in trait procrastination, state variables, such as fatigue and affect, 
do not seem to vary as a function of behavioral procrastination.  Findings from the 
present study also provide weak support for a relationship between trait procrastination 
and state fatigue, as trait procrastination was only a significant predictor of morning 
subjective fatigue during Week 1 after accounting for other trait variables that have been 
shown to predict subjective fatigue.  Taken together, these results indicate that the 
relationship between procrastination and fatigue oprates more strongly at the trait level 
than at the state level.   
Practical Implications 
In addition to these methodological and theoretical implications, several practical 
implications arise from the present study.  Trait procrastination contributed unique 
prediction above and beyond that of amount of time slept to the prediction of the amount 
of time spent delaying getting out of bed in the morning.  The inverse of this relationship 
also holds true, such that the amount of time spent d laying getting out of bed in the 
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morning adds unique prediction to trait procrastination.  As a result, knowing on average 
how long a person spends snoozing each morning will aid in the prediction of his/her 
level of trait procrastination.  This relationship may prove useful for individuals who are 
privy to the sleeping and waking habits of other individuals (e.g., college students and 
their roommates, traveling teams), in that those who do not prefer to delay tasks until 
close to the deadline may be able to choose to workith individuals who spend less time 
snoozing than others.   
Limitations 
Several limitations should be mentioned in regard to the present study.  First, the 
inclusion criteria limited participants to individuals who use an alarm to awaken each 
morning and press the snooze button on their alarms t least once per week-day morning.  
It is possible that some individuals do not wake up using an alarm, but do delay getting 
out of bed after first waking.  These individuals were not assessed in the current study.  
Second, the sample consisted solely of undergraduate students.  The inclusion 
criterion of using an alarm to wake up each week-day morning was implemented in order 
to provide a sample that better modeled a sample of working adults.  However, 
participants engaged in tasks and endeavors specific to being a student.  Possible patterns 
of delaying awakening for school-related tasks may not be the same for individuals in a 
working environment who engage in different daily tasks. 
Finally, despite the fact that many participants put off getting out of bed, the task 
of getting up each morning was one that all participants completed.  No participants 
reported that they did not get out of bed on any day assessed in the present study.  
However, there are other tasks which participants may procrastinate that they do not 
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complete, such as studying for an exam or going to the doctor.  It is possible that tasks 
which people intend to do but do not ever complete are different than tasks that people 
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Appendix A 
General Snooze Function Usage Questionnaire 
 
1. On an average morning, how many times do you press th  nooze button on your alarm 
clock?            
2. On an average morning, how long do you continue to sleep after your alarm goes off?  
 
3. At approximately what time do you set your alarm on days that you have class?       
 
4. Do you set your alarm on weekends?      
       
If you do not set your alarm on weekends, please go to item 6.  Otherwise, please 
continue to item 5. 
 
5. At approximately what time do you set your alarm on weekends? 
                                   
6. Do you have one or more roommate(s)?  
 
 
If you do not have one or more roommate(s), please go to the next page.  Otherwise, 
please continue to items 7 and 8. 
 
7. Does your alarm clock wake your roommate(s) up in the mornings?                      
                                           
8. Do you think your roommate(s) is/are affected by your snooze button usage?               
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Appendix B 
Adult Inventory of Procrastination 
1. I pay bills on time. 
2. I am prompt and on time for my engagements (e.g., classes, appointments, activities). 
3. I lay out my clothes the night before I have an engagement so I won’t be late. 
4. I find myself running later than I would like tobe. 
5. I don’t get things done on time. 
6. If someone were to teach a course on how to get things done on time, I would attend. 
7. My friends and family think I wait until the last minute. 
8. I get important things done with time to spare. 
9. I am not very good at meeting deadlines. 
10. I find myself running out of time. 
11. I schedule doctor’s appointments when I am supposed to without delay. 
12. I am more punctual than most people I know. 
13. I do routine maintenance on things I own (e.g., changing the car’s oil) as often as I 
      should. 
14. When I have to be somewhere at a certain time, my friends expect me to run a bit late. 
15. Putting things off until the last minute has cot me money in the past year. 
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Appendix C 
Achievement Goal Orientation Questionnaire 
 
1.  It is important for me to do better than other students. 
 
2.  Sometimes I am afraid that I may not understand he content of my classes as  
     thoroughly as I would like. 
 
3.  I just want to avoid doing poorly in my classes. 
 
4.  It is important for me to understand the content of my courses as thoroughly as  
     possible. 
 
5.  It is important for me to do well compared to ohers in college. 
 
6.  I am often concerned that I may not learn all there is to learn in my classes. 
 
7.  My fear of performing poorly in my classes is often what motivates me. 
 
8.  I desire to completely master the material presented in my classes. 
 
9.  I worry that I may not learn all that I possibly could in college. 
 
10. My goal in my classes is to avoid performing poorly. 
 
11. My goal in college is to get a better grade-point-average (GPA) than most of the other  
      students. 
 
12. I want to learn as much as possible from my classes in college. 
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Appendix D 
 
Chalder’s Fatigue Scale 
 
 
1.  I have problems with tiredness. 
 
2.  I feel a need to rest more. 
 
3.  I feel sleepy or drowsy. 
 
4.  I have problems starting things. 
 
5.  I lack energy. 
 
6.  My muscles feel weak. 
 
7.  I feel weak in general. 
 
8.  I have difficulty concentrating. 
 
9.  I have problems thinking clearly. 
 
10.  I find myself misspeaking. 
 
11.  I have trouble remembering things. 
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Appendix E 
 
Karolinska Sleep Questionnaire 
 
 
1. I have difficulty falling asleep. 
 
2. I experience disturbed sleep. 
 
3. I awaken repeatedly throughout the night. 
 
4. I awaken before I intend to. 





1.  Considering only your own “feeling best” rhythm, at what time would you get up if 
you were entirely free to plan your day?  (Please round to the nearest hour.) 
 
                          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AM          PM
  
          Midnight 
 
2. Considering only your own “feeling best” rhythm, at what time would you go to bed if 
you were entirely free to plan your day?  (Please round to the nearest hour.) 
 
                          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AM          PM
  
          Midnight 
 
   
 
3.  If there is a specific time at which you have to get up in the morning, to what extent 
are you dependent on being woken up by an alarm clock? 
 
  Not at all dependent 
  Slightly dependent 
  Fairly dependent 
  Very dependent 
 
4.  Assuming adequate environmental conditions (e.g., normal room temperature), how 
easy do you find getting up in the morning? 
 
  Not at all easy 
  Not very easy 
  Fairly easy 
  Very easy 
 
5.  How alert do you feel during the first half hour after having woken in the mornings? 
 
  Not at all alert 
  Slightly alert 
  Fairly alert 
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6.  How is your appetite during the first half hour after having woken in the mornings? 
 
  Not at all hungry 
  Slightly hungry 
  Fairly hungry 
  Very hungry 
 
7.  During the first half hour after having woken in the mornings, how tired do you feel? 
 
  Very tired 
  Fairly tired 
  Fairly refreshed 
  Very refreshed 
 
8.  When you have no commitments the next day, at wh t time do you go to bed 
compared to your usual bed time? 
 
  Seldom or never later 
  Less than one hour later 
  1-2 hours later 
  More than 2 hours later 
 
9.  You have decided to engage in some physical exercise with a friend.  Your friend 
suggests that you do this one hour twice a week and the best time for her is between 7am 
and 8am.  Bearing in mind nothing else but your own “feeling best” rhythm, how do you 
think you would perform? 
 
  Would be on good form 
  Would be on reasonable form 
  Would find it difficult 
  Would find it very difficult 
 
10.  At what time in the evening do you feel tired and, as a result, in need of sleep?   
       (Please round to the nearest hour.) 
 
                          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AM          PM
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11.  You wish to be at your best performance for a test which you know is going to be 
mentally exhausting and lasting for two hours.  You are entirely free to plan your day.  
Considering only your own “feeling best” rhythm, whic  ONE of the four testing times 
would you choose? 
 
  8:00am – 10:00am 
  11:00am – 1:00pm 
  3:00pm – 5:00pm 
  7:00pm – 9:00pm 
 
12.  If you went to bed at 11pm, at what level of tiredness would you be? 
 
  Not at all tired 
  A little tired 
  Fairly tired 
  Very tired 
 
13.  For some reason you have gone to bed several hours later than usual, but there is no 
need to get up at any particular time the next morning.  Which ONE of the following 
events are you most likely to experience? 
 
  Will wake up at the usual time and will NOT fall back asleep 
  Will wake up at the usual time and will doze thereafter 
  Will wake up at the usual time but will fall asleep again 
  Will NOT wake up until later than usual 
 
14.  One night you have to remain awake between 4am and 6am in order to carry out a 
night watch.  You have no commitments the next day. Which ONE of the following 
alternatives would suit you best? 
 
  Would NOT go to bed until watch was over 
  Would take a nap before and sleep after 
  Would sleep before and nap after 
  Would ONLY sleep before the watch  
 
15.  You have to do two hours of hard physical work.  You are entirely free to plan your 
day.  Considering only your own “feeling best” rhytm, which ONE of the following 
times would you choose? 
 
  8:00am – 10:00am 
  11:00am – 1:00pm 
  3:00pm – 5:00pm 
  7:00pm – 9:00pm 
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16.  You have decided to engage in hard physical exercise with a friend.  Your friend 
suggests that you do this one hour twice a week and the best time for her is between 
10pm and 11pm.  Bearing in mind nothing else but yor own “feeling best” rhythm, how 
do you think you would perform? 
 
  Would be on good form 
  Would be on reasonable form 
  Would find it difficult 
  Would find it very difficult 
 
 
17.  Suppose that you can choose your own work hours.  Assume that you worked a five 
hour day (including breaks) and that your job was interesting and paid by results.  Which 
five consecutive hours would you select?  Please check five boxes. 
 
                          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AM          PM
  
          Midnight 
                       
 
18.  At what time of day to you think you reach your “feeling best” peak?  Please check 
one box and round to the nearest hour. 
 
                          
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
AM          PM
  
          Midnight 
 
 
19.  One hears about “morning” and “evening” types of people.  Which ONE of these 
types do you consider yourself to be? 
 
  Definitely a “morning” type 
  Rather more a “morning” than an “evening” type 
  Rather more an “evening” than a “morning” type  
  Definitely an “evening” type 
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Appendix G 
 
Münich Chronotype Questionnaire 
 
1. Do you have a regular work and/or school schedule? If yes, how many days per 
week?   
 
Questions 2-8: The following questions pertain to work and/or school days.  
 
2. I go to bed at __________ o’clock  _____am  _____pm 
 
3. I actually get ready to fall asleep at __________ o’clock _____am  _____pm. 
 
4. I need __________ minutes to fall asleep. 
 
5. I wake up at __________ o’clock _____am  _____pm. 
 
6. After __________ minutes, I get up. 
 
7. Do you use an alarm clock to wake up on work and/or school days? 
 
8. If yes, do you regularly wake up before the alarm first rings? 
 
Questions 9-15: The following questions pertain to free days (e.g., weekends). 
 
9. I go to bed at __________ o’clock _____am  _____pm. 
 
10. I actually get ready to fall asleep at __________ o’clock _____am  _____pm. 
 
11. I need __________ minutes to fall asleep. 
 
12. I wake up at __________ o’clock _____am  _____pm. 
 
13. After __________ minutes, I get up. 
 
14. Is the wake-up time you have just given due to the use of an alarm clock even on 
free days? 
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Questions 16-17: The following questions pertain to the amount of time you spend in 
daylight. 
 
16. How long do you spend outside (in daylight, without a roof above your head) on  
work and/or school days?  Please give an average valu for a typical day. 
 
 
17. How long do you spend outside (in daylight, without a roof above your head) on  
free days?  Please give an average value for a typical day. 
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Appendix H 
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Appendix I 
IPIP Personality Scales 
Conscientiousness  
1. I am always prepared. 
2. I make a mess of things. 
3. I am exacting in my work. 
4. I like order. 
5. I follow a schedule. 
6. I leave my belongings around. 
7. I avoid my duties. 
8. I pay attention to details. 
9. I often forget to put things back in their proper place. 
10. I get chores done right away. 
 
Impulse Control  
1. I keep my emotions under control. 
2. I let others finish what they are saying. 
3. I react intensely. 
4. I talk even when I know I shouldn’t. 
5. I often make a fuss. 
6. I shoot my mouth off. 
7. I am easily excited. 
8. I blurt out whatever comes into my mind. 
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Extraversion  
1. I am the life of the party. 
2. I have little to say. 
3. I feel comfortable around people. 
4. I start conversations. 
5. I keep in the background. 
6. I talk a lot to different people at parties. 
7. I don’t like to draw attention to myself. 
8. I don’t talk a lot. 
9. I don’t mind being the center of attention. 
10.  I am quiet around strangers. 
 
Neuroticism  
1. I often feel blue. 
2. I have frequent mood swings. 
3. I feel comfortable with myself. 
4. I am often down in the dumps. 
5. I am very pleased with myself. 
6. I rarely get irritated. 
7. I seldom feel blue. 
8. I dislike myself. 
9. I am not easily bothered by things. 
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Self-Regulation/Self-Control  
1. I have no trouble eating healthy foods. 
2. I do not exercise on a regular basis. 
3. I forego things that are bad for me in the long run even if they make me feel good    
      in the short run. 
4. I am not very good at getting things done. 
5. I can always say “enough is enough.” 
6. I give in to my urges. 
7. I do my tasks only just before they need to get done. 
8. I can stay on a diet. 
9. I let myself be taken over by urges to spend or eat too much. 
10. I can’t resist eating cookies or candy if they are round. 
11.  I am a highly disciplined person. 
 
Resourcefulness 
1. I can handle complex problems. 
2. I can’t make up my mind. 
3. I am good at many things. 
4. I am easily discouraged. 
5. I complete tasks successfully. 
6. I wait for others to lead the way. 
7. I formulate ideas clearly. 
8. I am easily intimidated. 
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Perfectionism  
1. I continue until everything is perfect. 
2. I want every detail taken care of. 
3. I am not bothered by messy people. 
4. I want things to proceed according to plan. 
5. I demand perfection in others. 
6. I am not bothered by disorder. 
7. I expect dedicated work from others. 
8. I want everything to be “just right.” 
9. I keep a sharp eye on others’ work. 
 
Curiosity 
1. I find the world a very interesting place. 
2. I am never bored. 
3. I am not all that curious about the world. 
4. I am always busy with something interesting. 
5. I can find something of interest in any situation. 
6. I think that my life is extremely interesting. 
7. I find it difficult to entertain myself. 
8. I am excited by many different activities. 
9. I have few interests. 
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Anxiety 
1. I am afraid that I will do the wrong thing. 
2.  I feel threatened easily. 
3.  I don’t worry about things that have already happened. 
4.  I feel guilty when I say “no.” 
5.  I spend time thinking about past mistakes. 
6.  I worry about things. 
7. I feel crushed by setbacks. 
8.  I am easily hurt. 
9.  I don’t let others discourage me. 




Weeks 1 & 3 
 
1. At what time was your alarm set this morning? 
2. At what time did you turn your alarm off? 
3. How many times did you press the snooze button? 
4. Indicate the time at which you awoke this morning.  That is, the first time at 
which you were awake and did not go back to sleep. 
5. At what time did you get out of bed this morning? 
6. What time did you fall asleep last night/this morning? 
7. Did you use multiple alarms to wake you up this morning? 
8. If yes, how many alarms did you use? 
 
Week 2 (Experimental Condition Only) 
 
1. At what time was your alarm set this morning? 
2. At what time did you turn your alarm off? 
3. Indicate the time at which you awoke this morning.  That is, the first time at 
which you were awake and did not go back to sleep. 
4. At what time did you get out of bed this morning? 
5. What time did you fall asleep last night/this morning? 
6. Did you use any alarm in addition to the study alarm to wake you up? 
7. If yes, at what time was that alarm set? 




1. At what time is/was your first scheduled activity today? 
2. Did you engage in any activity before getting out f bed this morning? (e.g., watching  
    TV, checking email, talking on the phone) 
3. If you did engage in an activity before getting out of bed this morning, approximately  
    how long? 
4. Did something or someone else, other than the alarm(s) that you set, wake you up this  
    morning? 




1.  Did you take a nap today? 
2.  If yes, how long was your nap? 
3.  If yes, at what time did your nap start? 











Questions 1 through 10 were asked of experimental participants regarding Weeks 1 
and 3, and of control participants regarding all weeks of the study.  Questions 
pertaining to Week 2 were altered for the experimental group to read “after turning 
off the study alarm” in place of “after pressing the snooze button.”  Questions 11 and 
12 were asked of both groups regarding future behavior expectations. 
 
1. After pressing the snooze button, I went back to sleep. 
2. After pressing the snooze button, I dozed in and out of sleep. 
3. After pressing the snooze button, I lay awake thinking of things I needed to do. 
4. After pressing the snooze button, I engaged in an activity (e.g., reading, watching 
TV, checking e-mail). 
5. I wished I did not put off getting out of bed in the morning. 
6. After pressing the snooze button, I lay in bed an changed my plans for that 
morning (e.g., skipped breakfast so I could sleep a little longer). 
7. Putting off getting out of bed in the morning made me late for my first scheduled 
activity of the day. 
8. I found it difficult to get up in the morning. 
9. I planned to do more things in the morning befor my first scheduled activity than I 
actually did. 
10. Putting off getting out of bed in the morning bothered people who are close to me 
(e.g., friends, family, roommates). 
11. Would you choose to use an alarm without a snooze button in the future? 
12. Do you think you will change your alarm and snoozing habits after participating 
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Appendix N 
 
Exploration of secondary hypotheses which pertain to relationships between trait 
variables 
 
             Hypothesis                          Anticipated Effect Size          Results             
 
Note. N=110. aOne-tailed test. 
* p<.05. **p<.01 
 
The majority of the hypotheses related to trait variables were supported in the 
present study.  In addition, many of the correlations btained in the current study were 
similar to the values that were anticipated.  Each of t e above hypotheses and results are 
discussed in turn below.   
5:   Trait procrastination will be negatively     
      related to mastery orientation. 
r = -.28 r = -.18 
   
6:   Trait procrastination will be positively  
      related to performance orientation. 
r = .27 r = -.09 
   
7:   Sleep disturbance will be positively  
      associated with trait fatigue. 
r = .60 r =  .17 
   
9:   Eveningness will be negatively   
      associated with trait procrastination. 
r = -.35 r = -.32** 
   
11: Trait procrastination will be positively  
      associated with trait negative affect. 
r = .30 r =  .29** 
   
12: Trait procrastination will be negatively  
      associated with trait positive affect. 
r = -.30 r = -.31** 
   
13: Trait subjective fatigue will be positively  
      associated with trait negative affect. 
r = .45 r =  .52** 
   
15: Trait subjective fatigue will be negatively  
      associated with positive affect. 
r = -.45 r = -.36** 
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In order to test Hypothesis 5, scores on the performance and mastery axes of the 
achievement goal orientation questionnaire were averaged across approach and avoidance 
dimensions in order to obtain mean performance and mastery ratings.  Hypothesis 5 was 
not supported, as the correlation between the mastery dimension and mean 
procrastination was not significant (r = -.18, ns).  Similarly, support was not provided for 
Hypothesis 6, in that a nonsignificant correlation was found between the performance 
dimension and mean procrastination (r = -.09, ns).  Taken together, these results suggest 
that procrastination may not be related to the performance and mastery dimensions of 
goal orientation when goal orientation is assessed through a broad topic such as overall 
college performance.  However, the internal consistency of the collapsed scales for 
performance and mastery were relatively low (α = .68 and α = .75 respectively).  
Interestingly, procrastination was significantly and negatively related to the approach 
dimension of goal orientation (r = -.22, p = .02), but not the avoidance dimension (r = -
.05, ns).   
Hypothesis 7 was not supported, as there was a nonsignificant correlation between 
the CFS and KSQ.  This finding suggests that trait subjective fatigue is not significantly 
related to global reports of sleep disturbance.  A significant positive correlation was 
found between the AIP and MEQ (r = -.32, p<.01), suggesting that those who score 
higher in trait procrastination also report greater preferences towards eveningness.   
Several hypotheses were supported with regards to positive and negative affect.  
Hypothesis 11 was supported in that a significant positive correlation was also found for 
the AIP and NA (r = .29, p<.01), suggesting that those who score higher in trait 
procrastination also report greater negative affect.  In contrast, those who score higher in 
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trait procrastination also reported lower levels of p sitive affect, as the AIP and PA were 
negatively correlated (r = -.31, p<.01).  This provides support for Hypothesis 12.  
Hypotheses 13 and 15 were supported by a positive corr lation between the CFS and NA 
(r = .52, p<.01) and a negative correlation with PA (r = -.36, p<.01), respectively.  These 
findings suggest that those who report greater overall subjective fatigue also report 
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Appendix O 
 
Exploratory hypotheses related to afternoon subjectiv  fatigue and goal orientation 
 
Afternoon Fatigue 
A priori hypotheses were not posited regarding daily fternoon fatigue levels.  
Exploratory analyses similar to those conducted with subjective morning fatigue levels to 
explore state afternoon fatigue.  These analyses include correlations, paired t-tests, and 
hierarchical regression analyses. 
Similar to correlations computed with morning fatigue scores, correlations were 
computed between the KSQ, MEQ, and average Week 1 afternoon fatigue scores.  
Similar to results with morning subjective fatigue, afternoon subjective fatigue was 
moderately and negatively correlated with the MEQ (r = -.22, p<.05).  However, in 
contrast to subjective morning fatigue, subjective aft rnoon fatigue was not related to the 
KSQ.  These results suggest that participants who rep rted greater preferences for 
eveningness also reported greater afternoon fatigue, but eveningness preferences were not 
related to global reports of sleep disturbance. 
Paired t-tests were conducted to explore whether afternoon fatigue was different 
for experimental participants during Week 2 when they were instructed to use the study 
alarm and minimize snooze time.  Similar to findings related to subjective morning 
fatigue, experimental participants did not report significantly different levels of afternoon 
fatigue during Week 2 compared to Week 1 or 3. 
Finally, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to assess whether snooze 
time predicted afternoon fatigue after controlling for sleep time.  Table O17 shows that 
sleep time predicted afternoon fatigue in Weeks 2 and 3, with snooze time only adding 
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unique prediction in Week 3.  Taken together, these r ults suggest that afternoon fatigue 
reports were relatively similar to morning fatigue in that they exhibited a similar pattern 
of relationships with other variables. 
Goal Orientation.   
Hypotheses were proposed a priori with respect to trait procrastination and the 
performance-mastery axis of goal orientation, but hypotheses were not suggested 
regarding the ways in which snooze time might be related to these dimensions of goal 
orientation.  Nonsignificant correlations were found between the amount of snooze time 
and performance or mastery goal orientation during all three weeks of the study for both 
the experimental and control groups.  These findings are not surprising given the 
nonsignficant relationship between trait procrastination and these orientations in the 
current study.  Point-biserial correlations were also conducted to assess whether goal 
orientation was related to whether or not participants with different orientation 
preferences would report more willingness to use a different alarm and/or change their 
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Table O17  
 
Snooze Time as the Predictor of Subjective Afternoon Fatigue 
 
    Week          Predictor                    ∆R2                 df               β                  
1 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.14* 1, 108 -.30* 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.01 2, 107  .12 
 Total R2 .15*   
     
2 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.11* 1, 108 -.40* 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.03 2, 107 -.18 
 Total R2 .14*   
     
3 Step 1 
  Minutes Slept  
.15** 1, 108 -.53** 
 Step 2 
  Snooze Time  
.04 2, 107 -.24 
 Total R2 .19**   
 
Note. N = 110. 
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